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RECALIBRATING PATENT VENUE 
COLLEEN V. CHIEN AND MICHAEL RISCH 
ABSTRACT 
 For most of patent law’s 200-plus year history, patent holders 
could sue only in the district inhabited by the defendant.  In 1990, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided 
that the scope of permissible venue extended to all districts with 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  In recent years, patent-
ees have flocked to certain districts, fueling the widespread per-
ception that patentees, particularly those that do not practice their 
patents, called non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), are abusing fo-
rum.  Responsive to these concerns, Congress and the courts have 
moved to reinstate a more restrictive rule, culminating in the Su-
preme Court’s 2017 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group 
Brands LLC1 decision to limit venue to locations of the defendant.  
Yet, incredibly, to date there has been no measure of the overall 
pervasiveness of forum shopping and whether TC Heartland or any 
other venue reform will change this phenomenon. 
 We address this gap by estimating the differential impacts of re-
form on filing patterns.  We find, based on an analysis of approxi-
mately 1500 patent and non-patent cases filed in 2015 that about 
86% of patent cases—a striking share—were brought outside of 
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the defendant’s home district.  This practice is not limited to non-
practicing entities, however; corporations, universities, and indi-
viduals all filed outside of defendant districts.  Things would have 
been different if venue were reformed, but much depends on how 
reform is implemented.  If the Supreme Court’s decision to restrict 
venue to where the defendant resides or has an established place 
of business were already in effect, an estimated 58% of 2015 cases 
would have had to have been filed in a different venue.  If the Con-
gressional proposal to change venue to include home districts with 
research or manufacturing connections to the case had been in ef-
fect, about half the NPE cases in our sample would have needed to 
be refiled in another district, but only 14% of the operating com-
pany cases would.  Cases would have become less concentrated in 
a single district, with the top district, Delaware, capturing 20–24% 
of cases, but the top three districts, the District of Delaware, the 
Eastern District of Texas, and the Northern District of California, 
would still have the majority of cases.  Regardless of the reform, 
we expect smaller defendants to get more from venue relief than 
larger defendants because of their relatively smaller footprints.  
Among NPEs, universities, individuals, and small companies 
should be impacted to a lesser extent than patent assertion entities 
(“PAEs”), considerably so if the VENUE Act were enacted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A party planning to file a lawsuit often has the option of filing its case 
in several different districts.  Cost and convenience are likely to factor into 
this decision to some extent, but also important—some would say more so—
is the expectation that certain forums are more likely than others to favor the 
plaintiff’s interest, perhaps by interpreting the law in a desired fashion or by 
offering procedural or other advantages.  The selection of a forum believed 
to be favorable to one’s side—usually the plaintiff’s, though defendants have 
some opportunities to engage in the practice as well—is referred to as “forum 
shopping.”2 
But while forum shopping has been called a “national legal pastime,”3 
“rampant,”4 and an “evil” to be “exorcis[ed],”5 debates on forum shopping 
are often long on rhetoric and short on facts.  What we know is that, over the 
past decade, patent plaintiffs have increasingly chosen to file their suits in 
just a few districts, primarily the otherwise little-noted Eastern District of 
Texas.  Though the District encompasses about one quarter of the State of 
                                                          
 2.  See Francesco Parisi & Erin A. O’Hara, Conflict of Laws, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 387, 389 (Peter Newman ed., 2002).  Parisi and O’Hara 
distinguish between bilateral, ex ante forum selection (by means of forum selection clauses), and ex 
post forum shopping (as described above) on the ground that the former, but not the latter, is likely 
to be efficient.  Id.  Forum selection clauses are found in many contracts, particularly mass mer-
chandise contracts, and generally are enforceable.  See, e.g., Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (finding that when parties have agreed to a valid forum selection 
clause, a court should give controlling weight to that clause except for in the most exceptional 
cases). 
 3.  J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE 
L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) (“[F]orum-shopping, among both federal and state courts, [has become] a 
national legal pastime.”). 
 4.  Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the 
Bankruptcy Courts, 1 J. SCHOLARLY PERSP. 55, 57 (2005). 
 5.  Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1507 (1995). 
 50 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:47 
Texas geographically speaking, the Eastern District’s 3.5 million people6 
comprise only about 13% of the population of Texas, and about 1% of the 
total U.S. population.7  In 2015, nearly 44% of all patent cases were initiated 
there,8 and in 2016, over 36% were.9  The next closest district—which is also 
out of proportion compared to population—is Delaware, at about 10% of all 
patent cases.10 
To be sure, the state of venue law before TC Heartland allowed filings 
in these districts, and there is no rule against forum shopping.  Indeed, there 
are good business reasons for choosing a favorable forum.  Thus, whether 
one views forum shopping as good or bad is often entwined with one’s views 
of how the law should treat plaintiffs and defendants.  However, whether fo-
rum shopping is consistent with the public interest is another matter.  The 
sense that filing in Texas provides advantages to plaintiffs in outcomes and 
procedures—for better or worse—has harmed the reputation of the patent 
system.  This conglomeration of cases has produced bizarre behavior that 
includes the sponsoring of an outdoor skating rink by frequent defendant 
Samsung to curry favor with local juries.11  While choice of forum, in theory, 
can produce a more efficient, responsive judiciary, we believe that a system 
that incentivizes over-selection is far less defensible. 
The Eastern District of Texas has been the most popular venue for patent 
cases in all but two of the last ten years, but not among all plaintiffs.  While 
63% of patent assertion entity (“PAE”, also known by the pejorative “troll”)12 
filings in 2015 were in the Eastern District of Texas,13 less than 10% of filings 
by operating companies and individuals were filed there.  Any change to the 
                                                          
 6.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, District Info, http://www.justice.gov/usao-edtx/district-info (last 
updated Mar. 17, 2015). 
 7.  The U.S. population was 320 million in 2015 and 325 million in 2017.  U.S. POPULATION 
BY YEAR, http://www.multpl.com/united-states-population/table (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).  
 8.  Brian Howard, Announcing the Patent Litigation Year in Review 2015, LEX MACHINA 
BLOG (Mar. 16, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/14318/. 
 9.  Brian Howard, 2016 Fourth Quarter Litigation Update, LEX MACHINA BLOG (Jan. 12, 
2017), http://lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update/. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See Tom Gerencer, John Oliver Takes on Patent Trolls, MONEYNATION (May 4, 2015), 
http://moneynation.com/john-oliver-takes-patent-trolls/ (describing sketch on John Oliver’s show 
Last Week Tonight). 
 12.  Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 316 n.125 (2010). defining the term, 
“patent assertion entities” as “entities that use patents primarily to get licensing fees rather than to 
support the development or transfer of technology” and others who seek to commercialize their 
technology.  Id. at 300. 
 13.  UNIFIED PATENTS, 2015 PATENT DISPUTE REPORT (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.uni-
fiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report [hereinafter 2015 PATENT DISPUTE 
REPORT].  In this Article, we adopt Unified Patents’ definition and coding of a PAE: an “[e]ntity 
whose primary activity is licensing patents and acquired most of its patents from another entity.”  
Id.  In Parts III and IV, we differentiate between the impact of venue reform on patent assertion 
entities and other types of non-practicing entities (“NPEs”).  Infra Parts III–IV. 
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system will have differing costs and benefits for these and other groups of 
affected parties. 
To be clear, in modeling different venue reform choices, we do not pur-
port to claim that any venue reform would be, on balance, welfare enhancing, 
nor can we know with certainty the extent to which venue reform would 
change the number of cases that might be filed.  Though limiting plaintiff 
options would dampen plaintiff filings, all other things being equal, we can-
not count on this condition.  However, we do make one thing clear: a patent 
system in which so much rides on where a lawsuit is filed is deeply flawed.  
As such, there is a chance, in contrast to other troll-targeting patent reforms 
that would sweep more broadly, such as loser-pays legislation or limits on 
discovery,14 reforms that would make forum shopping harder may represent 
changes upon which most of the patent system’s diverse stakeholders can 
agree.15 
There are two main routes for effecting changes to the law—Congress 
and the Court.  Several bills with venue reform provisions have been intro-
duced in Congress for potential consideration in the near term.  More im-
portantly, in May 2017, the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v. 
Kraft Food Group Brands LLC,16 a case that squarely presented the question 
of whether patent venue should be recalibrated and restored to a narrower 
ambit. 
During the time preceding TC Heartland, plaintiffs’ expansive choice 
of venue was the exception more than the rule, considering patent law’s 200-
plus-year history during which venue was restricted to districts inhabited by 
the defendant, namely its state of incorporation.  But in 1990, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in response to a change in the 
general venue law enacted by Congress in 1988, held that Congress intended 
to make the patent rule more permissive and allow disputes to be filed in any 
district in which there was personal jurisdiction over the defendant.17  Since 
corporations tend to sell products throughout the United States, the court’s 
interpretation basically permitted patent owners to sue defendants for in-
fringement anywhere,18 so long as they can survive a motion to transfer. 
                                                          
 14.  See, e.g., Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (PATENT Act), 
Senate Judiciary Comm., https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Patents,%2004-29-
15,%20PATENT%20Act%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf  (describing provisions that would limit early 
discovery and shift fees if the losing party was not “objectively reasonable”). 
 15.  We realize, of course, that patent plaintiffs may not be so happy with such changes, though 
if given a choice of sweeping reform and venue reform, they might well pick venue. 
 16.  TC Heartland L.L.C. v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 17.  VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abro-
gated by TC Heartland L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514, at 1514. 
 18.  See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (shipping product through a state’s distribution channels conferred jurisdiction).  For further 
discussion, see, for example, Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1451–55 
(2010). 
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Scholars, advocates, and late-night comedians19 accused trolls of taking 
over the patent system by filing in Texas and contemplated how the rules 
should be reformed.  As part of this groundswell, the decades-old plaintiff-
friendly rule that the Federal Circuit endorsed came under attack.  One de-
fendant’s challenge presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
swing the venue pendulum back toward defendants, through the TC Heart-
land case, and the Court obliged.20  The provisions introduced before Con-
gress would position the law somewhere in between the extremes, allowing 
cases to be brought in districts of the plaintiff and the defendant with a con-
nection to the accused infringement.21 
While most academic commentary on forum shopping in patents to date 
has focused on explaining filing patterns and suggesting ways to curb forum 
shopping,22 our Article takes a different approach.  Rather than debate the 
theory or merits of various versions of venue reform in the abstract, we em-
pirically address several basic questions that have, as yet, curiously been 
glossed over in the national debate: 1) How prevalent is forum shopping in 
patent law, especially as compared to other cases?; 2) Who is doing it?; 3) 
What would the overall impact of proposed reforms be?; and, in particular 4) 
Would the intense concentration of cases just shift from the Eastern District 
of Texas to another district if reform were enacted?  We report our findings 
briefly below and expand on them throughout this Article.  This is the first 
attempt that we are aware of to measure forum shopping across all plaintiffs 
in a single area of law.23 
Based on our analysis of nearly 1500 patent and non-patent cases, we 
find, first, that forum shopping in patent cases is indeed pervasive.  An over-
whelming majority of cases—a whopping 86% of them—were filed out of 
defendants’ venue;24 while forum shopping exists in non-patent cases, this is 
a much higher percentage and shows far more concentration in a few districts.  
This share is not only large, it is also more than double the share of cases that 
were filed in the Eastern District of Texas, suggesting that the phenomenon 
is much more widespread than just “trolls taking over Texas.” 
                                                          
 19.  See Gerencer, supra note 11. 
 20.  TC Heartland L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 21.  See infra Part I. 
 22.  See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 632–
38 (2015); Fromer, supra note 18, at 1444; Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 241, 241–42 (2016). 
 23.  See infra Part I.  The closest two studies, one by Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford 
and another by Samir D. Parikh, which both look at the prevalence of forum shopping in bankruptcy 
cases, limit their analyses to the bankruptcies of the largest firms.  See Lynn M. LoPucki & William 
C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Pub-
licly Held Companies, WIS. L. REV. 11 (1991); Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bank-
ruptcy, 46 CONN. L. REV. 159 (2013). 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
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Our second finding reinforces this point.  We find that not only did PAEs 
file out of the defendants’ venue but almost all other plaintiffs—universities, 
corporations, and individuals—did as well.  For example, even though 90% 
of PAEs initiated cases out of the defendants’ venue, 80% of corporate plain-
tiffs did so as well.25  Plaintiffs of all stripes took advantage of the Federal 
Circuit’s permissive rule and did what was convenient for them, not the de-
fendant. 
Having documented this baseline, we evaluate the static effects of a rule 
change.  To do so, we take a sample of 1000 randomly chosen patent cases 
from 2015 and assess whether or not they could have been brought in their 
chosen venues under proposed versions of the law.  We combine court rec-
ords with information about the parties themselves—their entity type, 
whether defendants were publicly traded companies and the primary indus-
tries they were in, and the past filing patterns of plaintiffs.  While the problem 
of forum shopping may appear targeted and concentrated in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, would a new rule simply shift filings to another location, such 
as Delaware, where many companies are incorporated, rather than resolve the 
concentration of patent cases? 
We find that under either a return to the past statute or adoption of pro-
posed legislation, the impact would be dramatic.  Between 53% and 58% of 
the 2015 cases in our sample—the majority—would have to have been filed 
in a different venue.  Because venue must be determined at the outset of a 
case, all cases, not just those that survive certain milestones, would be im-
pacted by this rule change.  However, among plaintiff types, the impacts 
would depend on which rule is implemented.  If plaintiffs’ home districts are 
also allowed, something Congress is considering primarily for the benefit of 
operating companies, universities, and failed startups, then 47% of non-prac-
ticing entity (“NPE”) cases would have to move while 14% of operating com-
pany cases would have to be refiled in a different district. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explores the legal and descrip-
tive history of patent venue and the enabling conditions and motivations for 
forum shopping through the present.  It also reviews the potential future of 
venue through the lens of current congressional and court activity.  Part II 
describes the methodology and assumptions we used to address the three is-
sues discussed above—the context, the static effects, and the dynamic effects 
of the proposed changes—through rigorous empirical analysis.  Part III pre-
sents and describes our results and their implications for venue reform efforts.  
Part IV considers which parties would be most likely to see relief from re-
form.  Part V concludes. 
                                                          
 25.  See infra Part III.A. 
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I.  LEGAL AND DESCRIPTIVE HISTORY OF PATENT VENUE 
The question of where patentees can properly bring their cases has re-
ceived a substantial amount of recent attention in light of the high concentra-
tion of patent filings in just a handful of venues.  But for much of patent law’s 
history, it had been well-settled that special rules limit where patent lawsuits 
can be brought.  In this Part, we discuss the evolution of patent venue law 
and related developments in general venue law as well as the combination of 
favorable law, favorable procedures, and favorable economics that have con-
tributed to the venue criticism.  Next, we consider the patterns of filing that 
have followed and previous developments intended to limit forum shopping 
in patent cases.  Finally, we discuss proposals for reforming patent venue 
currently under consideration. 
A.  How We Got Here—Permissive Venue in Patent Law 
In order to bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff must establish proper venue and 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  General rules, covering all civil suits, 
and rules specific to patent law, as well as rules that have sanctioned restric-
tive and permissive venue, have governed patent cases over their long his-
tory.  For the first hundred years or so, patent venue was governed by a gen-
eral statute.  Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed suits in civil 
cases—including patent cases—only where the defendant inhabited or could 
be found.26  In the early nineteenth century, most defendants were individuals 
and could be found only where they inhabited.  As a result, when Thomas 
Blanchard sought to enforce his patents over a time-saving turning lathe that 
permitted wood to be shaped into irregular forms such as gun stocks and tool 
handles, he had to enforce his patent in the venues of the woodworkers he 
accused of infringement—in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
and other locations.27 
The jurisdiction of the federal courts expanded with the Jurisdiction and 
Removal Act of 1875; before diversity and removal, state courts had heard 
many cases when both parties were in the same state.28  Afterward, suits could 
                                                          
 26.   Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (“And no civil suit shall be 
brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original pro-
cess in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the 
time of serving the writ . . . .”); see Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 208, 212 (1857) (deny-
ing venue where defendant was not an inhabitant of district). 
 27.  Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848, 860–
61 (2016). 
 28.  Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875); see Landmark 
Legislation: Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/his-
tory/legislation/landmark-judicial-legislation-text-document-9 (last visited Aug. 4, 2017). 
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still be filed wherever defendants inhabited or could be found,29 but while the 
rule was the same, the practical effect was broader than the habitation re-
quirement because defendants were “found” essentially anywhere there was 
a business presence.30  This development coincided with the rise of the “pa-
tent sharks,” patent holders who sued farmers for their use of farming imple-
ments such as sliding gates, barbed fences, and drivewells.31  The ability to 
consolidate multiple suits in a single venue led Congressman Nathaniel C. 
Deering of Iowa to report in 1879 that: 
[A] single attorney is preparing papers for more than one thousand 
cases; and that the attorneys for the patentee of the iron barbs for 
wire-fences are preparing papers for upward of four thousand cases 
in . . . our State.  Hundreds, if not thousands, of the unwary and 
unsuspecting farmers in my district will no doubt be compelled, by 
threats and intimidation, either to yield to the extortionate demands 
of these plunderers, and pay $10 or $20 each . . . or be dragged one 
hundred and fifty miles away from their homes, at great inconven-
ience and expense.32 
Note that these individuals were being sued in their home districts, and that 
the long distances were due to rural farm locations, but consider if they had 
all been sued 2000 or more miles from their homes.  Even during this time, 
where a patent case could be brought had an influence on its outcome. 
This early period of permissive venue came to an end about a decade 
after it started when, in 188733 and 1888,34 Congress passed revisions that 
generally narrowed venue, but in a complex way.  Under the new rule, if a 
case was brought under what was then federal question jurisdiction, then the 
suit could only be brought where the defendant inhabited.35  But in diversity 
cases (e.g., a case worth more than $500 but less than $2000 with parties in 
different states), plaintiffs could sue either where they resided or where the 
                                                          
 29.  Landmark Legislation: Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, supra note 28. (“[T]he act 
of 1875 attracted new types of litigation that swelled the caseload of the federal courts and chal-
lenged the existing organization of the judiciary.”). 
 30.  Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 376 (1877) (“They have in express terms, in consid-
eration of a grant of the privilege of doing business within the State, agreed that they may be sued 
there . . . .”). 
 31.  Beauchamp, supra note 27, at 926; Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Dis-
content, 1875–1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 59, 73 (1947). 
 32. Hayter, supra note 31, at 67–68. 
 33.  Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552–53 (1887). 
 34.  Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433, 433–34 (“[N]o civil suit shall be 
brought . . . against any person . . . in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, but 
where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different 
States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant . . . .”). 
 35.  Id.; Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373 § 1. 
 56 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:47 
defendant resided.36  In either case, defendants could no longer be sued where 
they were found, only where they inhabited.  However, for the first ten years 
of the new statute, courts were confused about the law’s applicability to pa-
tent cases.37  Eventually, the Supreme Court determined that, because district 
court jurisdiction to hear patent cases arose under a different statute, the gen-
eral venue provision did not apply; venue in patent cases was permissible 
essentially anywhere.38 
In response to this trend, in 1897, Congress clarified its intent that patent 
defendants should be sued only where they inhabited or where they had a 
place of business and committed infringing acts.39  This patent venue rule 
was narrower than a rule that allowed venue in any district with jurisdiction, 
but still broader than the inhabitant rule applicable to other cases.  In one 
sense, it was a return to venue where the defendant might be found, with the 
added proviso that the infringement also take place in the selected district.  In 
fact, the statute explicitly provided for service at other business locations, just 
as the “found” jurisdiction did.40 
Meanwhile, Congress continued to tinker with the general venue rules, 
enacting a provision that allowed broader venue in the case of two defendants 
in civil cases; notably, that rule’s provenance predated the 1897 patent venue 
rule.41  The Supreme Court confirmed in the 1942 case Stonite Products Co. 
v. Melvin Lloyd Co.42 that these general venue rules did not undermine appli-
cation of the special, narrower venue rules to patent cases, in large part be-
cause the recodification of the general rules did not trump the special rule.43 
But additional changes introduced additional ambiguity.  In 1948, the 
Judicial Code was recodified to its current form, which specifies in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b), rather succinctly, that patent venue is proper “in the judicial 
district where the defendant resides [rather than inhabits], or where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.”44  The terms “resides” and “inhabits” were 
                                                          
 36.  Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1 
 37.  Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 564 n.3 (1942) (describing older 
cases). 
 38.  In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893). 
 39.  Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, § 1, 29 Stat. 695, 695 (placing jurisdiction over a patent suit 
“in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant, 
whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have 
a regular and established place of business”). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, § 1, 11 Stat. 272, 272, amended by R.S. § 740, amended by 
JUDICIAL CODE § 52. 
 42.  315 U.S. 561 (1942). 
 43.  Id. at 566 (“Even assuming that R.S. § 740 [which derived from the Act of May 4, 1858] 
covered patent litigation prior to the Act of 1897, we do not think that its application survived that 
act, which was intended to define the exact limits of venue in patent infringement suits.”). 
 44.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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meant to be synonymous,45 but a related provision of the law, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c), was later revised to state that a corporate defendant resides 
anywhere it is doing business, seemingly restoring the broader concept of 
venue being proper anywhere a corporate defendant could be found.46 
The two changes implied a potential new meaning—that for corpora-
tions “reside” no longer meant “inhabit,” or place of incorporation, for patent 
venue.  This new ambiguity brought another Supreme Court case about a 
decade later, considering again whether the new general rule modified the 
special patent rule.  The very small difference between Sections 1400(b) and 
1391(c) made a big difference to a West Virginia glass company called 
Fourco that was sued in New York.47  The company had a place of business 
in New York and was doing business there, but the company was not com-
mitting infringing acts there.48  In other words, though Fourco could be found 
in New York, it did not inhabit the state, making the suit proper only if Sec-
tion 1391(c) had redefined “resides” as set forth in Section 1400(b). 
In its 1957 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.49 decision, the 
Supreme Court determined that Section 1391(c) was a general statute that 
had not actually changed the patent landscape or the vision of limited patent 
venue set forth by the Court in the Stonite case.50  Because Section 1400(b) 
is a specific prior statute, nothing indicated that Congress intended to change 
the meaning of Section 1400(b), the Court reasoned.  The term “resides” in 
Section 1400(b) continued to mean “inhabit” as it always had.51 
Ironically, despite fixed language, the relative breadth of patent venue 
changed with Congress’s whims in other parts of the statute.  When first 
passed as a response to unfettered venue choices, for the period from 1897 
until Section 1391(c) was passed in 1948, the patent rule provided for rela-
tively broad venue compared to non-patent cases, which limited filings to 
place of habitation.  But as Congress returned to unfettered venue choices for 
non-patent cases, patent venue began to look somewhat narrower. 
It is within this context that the latest dispute over patent venue appears 
in many ways to be history repeating itself.  Although 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) 
has remained unchanged since 1948, the congressional provisions governing 
general venue have undergone two additional revisions.  In 1988, a new 
clause was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)’s definition of residence, resulting 
                                                          
 45.  Historical and Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 46.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952); see Note, Federal Venue and the Corporate Plaintiff: Judicial 
Code Section 1391(c), 28 IND. L.J. 256, 256 (1953). 
 47.  Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957). 
 48.  Id. at 223–24. 
 49.  353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
 50.  Id. at 228–29. 
 51.  Id. 
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in the following language: “For purposes of venue under this chapter, a de-
fendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district 
in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is com-
menced.”52  These three words, the Federal Circuit held in its 1990 case, VE 
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,53  triggered a change in how 
Section 1400(b) should be interpreted because the patent venue rule was “un-
der this chapter.”54  As a result, patent holders could sue alleged infringers in 
“any district where there would be personal jurisdiction over the corporate 
defendant.”55  Thus was born the modern era of permissive venue for patents, 
joining other civil cases. 
Not content to leave venue alone, in 2011, Congress amended Section 
1391 again.  There were two primary changes.  First, Section 1391(a) now 
says the section will apply to venue in all civil actions, “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by law.”56  Second, instead of “under this chapter,” Section 1391(c) 
now reads, “[f]or all venue purposes.”57 
The courts did not adjust their interpretation of patent venue law after 
the most recent change, but should they have?  Whether the general venue 
statute should trump patent venue rules has been before the Supreme Court 
several times since 1887, and it is one of the questions that was presented to 
the Federal Circuit and then the Supreme Court in the TC Heartland case, 
described in further detail below. 
B.  Studying Forum Shopping 
Though VE Holding’s statutory construction expanded venue in patent 
cases, permissive venue is not unique to patent law.  Indeed, as Clermont and 
Eisenberg have observed, “[t]he American way is to provide plaintiffs with a 
wide choice of venues for suit.”58  Scholars have studied, critiqued, and de-
fended strategic forum choices in several areas of law, including mass torts 
and bankruptcy in modern times;59 there is even evidence from the 1600s that 
suggests that English judges made jurisdictional, procedural, and doctrinal 
                                                          
 52.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2012) (emphasis 
added)). 
 53.  917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 54.  Id. at 1579–80.  
 55.  Id. at 1583. 
 56.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012). 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1507.  As noted in the Introduction, though, it was 
not always the American way. 
 59.  See, e.g., James D. Cox et al., Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shop-
ping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 421 
(2009); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of 
Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968–71 (1999); 
Craig S. Hilliard & Martin P. Schrama, A Case Study on the Importance of Forum Selection in Mass 
Tort Litigation, 200 N.J.L.J. 382, 382-83 (2010).  
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choices to attract plaintiffs.60  A comprehensive study of transfer motions in 
the 1980s and 1990s found that cases that were successfully transferred to the 
defendant’s preferred venue were much less likely to result in a victory for 
the plaintiff.61  It is not surprising, then, that in certain areas of federal law 
that allow for forum shopping, parties have availed themselves of this option.  
In one of the few studies we know of to measure the extent of forum shop-
ping, Parikh found that among the largest bankruptcy cases from 2007–2012, 
69% were forum shopped.62  Sukhatme examined more than 500,000 diver-
sity cases and found that both plaintiffs and defendants were more likely to 
settle when away from their home jurisdictions.63 
C.  Patent Filing Trends 
But while permissive venue is not unique to patent law, among federal 
causes of action—besides bankruptcy64—forum shopping in patents has at-
tracted the most attention.65  In 2001, then-Professor Kimberly Moore (now 
                                                          
 60.  Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1186–87 (2007). 
 61.  Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1507, 1512 (finding, based on a study of 2.8 million 
terminations of federal civil cases between 1979 and 1991, a disparity in plaintiff win rates among 
transferred and non-transferred cases of 29% versus 58%, respectively). 
 62.  Parikh, supra note 23, at 177; see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 23, at 12 (finding 
a substantial number of bankruptcy cases involving the largest companies were filed in districts 
where the company had little or no physical presence). 
 63.  Neel U. Sukhatme, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Forum Shopping in Diversity 
Cases 3 (Aug. 18, 2014) (unpublished manucript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1989250. 
 64.  See Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the “Delawarization of Bankruptcy” Debate, 
52 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1316–17 (2003) (questioning whether the observed number of bankruptcies 
filed in Delaware differs that greatly from a random walk); Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 59, at 
968–71 (documenting and explaining the abrupt shift in 1990 when forum shoppers stopped filing 
in New York and started filing in Delaware); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of 
Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the 
Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 244–55 (2001) (presenting evidence of venue choice, debtor size, 
and refiling rates); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 23, at 12 (finding that a substantial number of 
bankruptcy cases were filed in districts “where the company had little or no physical presence”); 
Parikh, supra note 23, at 177 (finding 69% of the largest bankruptcy cases filed between 2007 and 
2012 were “forum shopped”); see also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based 
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 432–33 
(2006) (acknowledging the high number of filings in Delaware while critiquing Professor LoPucki’s 
explanations for it); Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed Companies 
Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Bankruptcy 1 (May 21, 2003) (un-
published manuscript), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&con-
text=faculty_scholarship (finding “no evidence of agency problems governing . . . venue choice” in 
bankruptcy). 
 65.  A search of forum shopping commentary in the context of copyright, trademark, antitrust, 
and civil RICO literature revealed only one empirical study, which found out-of-hometown forum 
shopping substantially less prevalent in copyright and trademark litigation than in patent litigation.  
See generally Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1065, 1095–97 (2016).  Outside of the federal courts, commentators have also considered forum 
shopping in the context of mass tort cases.  See, e.g., Hilliard & Schrama, supra note 59, at 382. 
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a judge on the Federal Circuit) published an empirical study showing that the 
five most popular districts at the time for patent litigation (the Central and 
Northern Districts of California, the Northern District of Illinois, the South-
ern District of New York, and the District of Massachusetts) collectively ac-
counted for only 15% of all civil case terminations but 29% of patent case 
terminations from 1995 to 1999.66  Moreover, although the clusters of filings 
within certain districts appeared to correlate with their proximity to large 
numbers of patent-seeking companies and their headquarters, other popular 
districts, including the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, did not.67  Rather, filings appeared to correlate (albeit not uniformly) 
with procedural advantages, such as time to trial, and with differential win 
rates.68  Since Judge Moore’s early work, Lemley has performed a similar 
analysis relating to district processes and outcomes with respect to later 
cases.69  Vishnubhakat examined survival rates by district for fifteen years of 
patent litigation,70 and Lii considered reversal rates by district.71 
None of these forum shopping studies, however, attempted to quantify 
the changes associated with different venue rules.  The closest study, Paten-
tography, considered how venue might cluster by technology area under cer-
tain constraints, an interesting yet oversimplified rule that has never been 
proposed in Congress.72  This Article expands on the prior literature in nu-
merous ways.  First, it shows how pervasive forum shopping really is. Sec-
ond, it shows how widespread the practice is among various plaintiff groups.  
Third, and most importantly, it provides the first detailed analysis of current 
and proposed venue proposals and addresses lingering questions about the 
effectiveness of reforms. 
                                                          
 66.  Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903 tbl.1, 904 (2001). 
 67.  Id. at 906.  Delaware is a popular state for incorporation, but in our sample, few of the 
corporations incorporated in Delaware actually had their principal place of business there.  
 68.  Id. at 907–23. 
 69.  Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 407–18 (2010); see 
also Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shop-
ping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 412 (2009) (examining forum shopping and 
outcomes before and after formation of the Federal Circuit). 
 70.  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of 
Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 76 (2011). 
 71.  Teresa Lii, Comment, Shopping for Reversals: How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Liti-
gation Forums, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 31, 31 (2013). 
 72.  Fromer, supra note 16, at 1478, 1493–506 (analyzing outcomes based solely on defend-
ant’s primary place of business rather than where venue is located would be proper under § 1400); 
see also Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy 
of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 396 (2011) (examining case concentration by district and judge). 
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D.  The Popularity of the Eastern District in the Past 
Over the past ten or so years, however, while the District of Delaware 
has grown to be the second most popular forum for patent litigation (Vir-
ginia’s popularity having declined for a variety of reasons),73 patent suits in-
creasingly have clustered in the Eastern District of Texas.  Table 1 below 
charts the raw numbers of patent actions filed in the Eastern District, begin-
ning in 1999—when there were only 14 actions—through the first half of 
2016—when there were 767 patent filings.  There were 2540 filings in 2015. 
 
TABLE 1: PATENT CASES FILED IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS74 
 
Patent Cases Filed in the Eastern District of Texas  
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
14 23 33 32 55 108 159 196 358 
  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
289 235 283 414 1247 1494 1425 2541 1662 
  
 
Of greater interest, however, is Table 2, which, based on data from Lex 
Machina and various academic studies, lists the patent caseload of the leading 
federal district courts by percentage.  In 2015, approximately 44% of all U.S. 
patent infringement actions were filed in the Eastern District of Texas.75  The 
                                                          
 73.  See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 280–81 (2016) (discussing factors that contributed 
to Delaware and Virginia’s popularity and the more recent adoption of measures intended to dis-
courage overuse of Virginia as a forum, leading to its decline as a patent forum). 
 74.  Source for data from 1999–2006: Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An 
Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for 
Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 206 tbl.6 (2007).  Source for data from 2007–2013: 
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 249 tbl.1.  Source for data from 2014: BRIAN C. HOWARD, LEX 
MACHINA, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW 5 fig.7 (2015), pages.lexmach-
ina.com/rs/lexmachina/images/2014%20Patent%20Litigation%20Report.pdf.  Source for data from 
2015 and 2016: BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION YEAR 
IN REVIEW 2016 4 fig.7 (2017), http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/098-SHZ-
498/images/LexMachina%202016%20Patent%20Litigation%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf. at i.   
Note that the jump from 2011 to 2012 is explained in large part by joinder rule changes in the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).  See infra text accompanying notes 79–82. 
 75.  2015 Patent Dispute Report, supra note 13, at fig.5. For the third quarter of 2015, Lex 
Machina reported a drop in filings nationally, to 1119, of which only 435 were filed in the Eastern 
District.  Brian Howard, Q3 2015 IP Filing Trends, LEX MACHINA (Oct. 9, 2015), http://lexmach-
ina.com/q3-2015-ip-filing-trends/.   
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Eastern District court also decided the largest proportion of NPE patent 
cases.76  In 2016, this share dropped to 37%.77 
  
                                                          
 76.  John R. Allison et al., How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits? 31 tbl. 2a 
(Stan. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 485, 2016). 
 77.  BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN 
REVIEW 2016 4 fig.7 (2017), http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/098-SHZ-
498/images/LexMachina%202016%20Patent%20Litigation%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf.  
 2017] RECALIBRATING PATENT VENUE 63 
TABLE 2: TOP 10 MOST POPULAR DISTRICTS FOR PATENT CASES, 2002–














                                                          
 78.  Leychkis, supra note 74, at 13 tbl. 5; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 249 tbl.1; BRIAN 
C. HOWARD, supra note 74; BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, supra note 74. 
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It is important to acknowledge that some of the growth in the share of 
cases in the Eastern District was due to the joinder rule changes in the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”),79 which required that cases against sep-
arate defendants be brought in separate actions rather than a single consoli-
dated action with as many as 100 defendants.  The size of this jump varied 
from district to district, based both on the predisposition to allow joinder and 
on the percentage of large cases.  Because the Eastern District of Texas is 
favored by NPEs and because NPEs tend to sue more defendants at once,80 
the jump from 2011 to 2012 reflects expected growth in the Eastern District, 
both in absolute numbers and in comparison to other districts.  Indeed, the 
anti-joinder provision of the AIA was targeted at the Eastern District.81  This 
does not downplay the significance of the Eastern District of Texas after 
2012; it merely shows that it had been busy for a few years before that.82 
The concentration of cases does not stop at the district court level.  The 
Eastern District’s longstanding practice is to assign judges to hear cases 
based on the division within the district in which the action is filed, rather 
than randomly assigning a judge as is more typical in districts with more 
judges or with fewer or more geographically concentrated divisions.83  Under 
a recent district General Order, for example, Chief Judge Clark is assigned 
100% of the patent actions filed in the Beaumont Division, Judge Mazzant is 
assigned 100% of Sherman Division patent cases, and Judge Gilstrap is as-
signed 95% of all civil litigation filed in Marshall Division (which includes 
patent). Judge Gilstrap also hears 30% of the patent cases filed in Tyler with 
the remaining Tyler patent matters assigned to Judge Schroeder.84  This dis-
tribution of cases explains how some repeat litigants manage to have all of 
their cases assigned to the same judge.85  It also explains how one single 
judge, Judge Gilstrap, wound up being assigned 982 patent actions in 2014—
just under one-fifth of all the patent infringement actions filed in the entire 
United States that year.86  Presumably, patentees might like the reliability of 
                                                          
 79.  Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 80.  Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 82 (2015); 
see also Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. 
REV. 649, 695 (2014). 
 81.  Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 592 (2012). 
 82.  Sag, supra note 65, at 1080, 1098 fig.11. 
 83.  See Anderson, supra note 22, at 671; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 254–55. 
 84.  See General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 16-7 (E.D. Tex. July 15, 2016), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/goFiles/16-07.pdf.  The district does occasionally 
deviate by assigning selected patent cases to designated senior judges from other districts, however. 
 85.  See Anderson, supra note 22, at 673 (citing Leychkis, supra note 74, at 215 tbl.8) (propo-
sitioning, “since 1999, Data Treasury Corporation, Orion IP, and IAP Intermodal have collectively 
filed thirty-seven patent suits in the district,” each “before a single judge,” respectively Judges Fol-
som, Davis, and Ward). 
 86.  See HOWARD, supra note 74, at 1 fig.2, 15. 
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knowing the presiding judge, for better or worse.  At worst, to the extent that 
plaintiffs believe a certain judge will be favorable, this rule would encourage 
fine-grained selection of forum.  At best, parties can opt-in to patent judge 
specialists.  Even in the best case, overloading a few judges is more likely to 
cause delays from overburden.87 
The long-standing tendency of patent plaintiffs to pick favorable venues 
raises an important but largely ignored first order question: are there real ben-
efits to the Eastern District of Texas?  A review of the evidence does not yield 
a single answer.  A comprehensive study of district court procedures and out-
comes did not list it among the top five places to file a lawsuit in terms of 
win rate or in terms of aggregate rankings.88  Instead, the nearby Northern 
District of Texas had by far the best win rate from 2000 to 2010.89  And the 
District of Delaware was more likely to send a case to trial.90  Time to trial 
was only the seventh best in the Eastern District of Texas from 1995 to 2014; 
median damages were only the fifth best, less than half of the next best dis-
trict.91  The best district for combined time to trial, success rate, and median 
damages award remains the Eastern District of Virginia.92  Nonetheless, for 
the seventeen years between 1988 and 2005, no Eastern District of Texas jury 
found in favor of a defendant.93  News of this pattern likely became more 
widespread and is reflected in the growth in 2005 and beyond. 
Putting aside outcomes, the Eastern District of Texas’s local procedures 
and people have also been a draw.  Some of these procedures are long-stand-
ing, while others were developed in the courtroom of Judge Ward before be-
ing adopted more widely.94  The Eastern District has maintained relatively 
                                                          
 87.  For example, the apparent reluctance of Eastern District judges to rule on summary judg-
ment motions could be explained, in part, by the sheer number of them pending at any given time. 
 88.  Lemley, supra note 66, at 407–09 tbl.3, 419–21 tbl.7. 
 89.  Id. at 407–09 tbl.3. 
 90.  Id. at 411–13 tbl.4.  The selection effect of certain types of cases into each district might 
affect this. 
 91.  CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: A 
CHANGE IN PATENTEE FORTUNES 15 fig.16 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf (reporting that from 1999 to 
2014, median damages in the Eastern District were just under $9 million, ranking fifth nationally 
but well ahead of the national median of $5.4 million); see also HOWARD, supra note 74, at 25 
fig.45 (reporting that, from 2005 through 2014, median damages in the Eastern District ranked third 
nationally, at $8.71 million based on 89 cases). 
 92.  BARRY ET AL., supra note 91, at 15 fig.16. 
 93.  Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases: Mar-
shall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 71 (2010).  The apparent 
discrepancy between the Eastern District of Texas’s high jury win rate and relatively mediocre over-
all ranking can be attributed to the high share of cases that settle or are determined by the bench.  
See Lemley, supra note 69, at 411 tbl.4 (showing a rate of 8% for cases that go to trial in the Eastern 
District of Texas). 
 94.  See Anderson, supra note 22, at 652 (noting that Judge Ward’s rules, which allowed an 
abbreviated nine-month discovery period and maintained strict adherence to “discovery deadlines 
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short times to trial (though with the increase in its caseload, the district’s ad-
vantage along this metric has declined).95  Perhaps more important is early 
and generous discovery coupled with a docket busy enough that it is difficult 
to have dispositive motions heard quickly.96  The Eastern District also has a 
reputation for refusing to decide summary judgment motions,97 which is 
likely at least indirectly tied to win rates and settlement pressure in that dis-
trict.  Finally, its juries have a reputation of awarding generous damages in 
patent cases.98 
And while the win rate is no longer what it was in 2005, parties in the 
Eastern District of Texas continue to see greater success than in other dis-
tricts.  According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), all NPEs had a 49% 
win rate there over a twenty-year period, in comparison with a 26% average 
win rate in other high-volume districts.99  Ashtor and others found that, from 
1995 to 2011, historic win rates for just PAEs were highest in the Eastern 
District among districts that decided more than five PAE cases.100  Allison, 
                                                          
[and] trial dates, allow[ed] plaintffs to impose a strict timeline on often overwhelmed defendants”); 
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 250, 266 & n.140. 
 95.  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 96.  See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 269 (highlighting that, in the Eastern District, 
“parties must produce all documents ‘that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses involved 
in this action’ in conjunction with initial disclosures and without awaiting a discovery request” and 
that “[d]efendants must complete their document collection and production—probably the most 
costly aspect of discovery—within a few months of the case filing”).   
 97.  See id., supra note 22, at 252 tbl.2, 312 app. 2 (showing that despite a larger docket, the 
court ruled on far fewer summary judgment motions).  Reporting the results of studies by Iancu and 
Chung and by Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz, Klerman and Reilly also noted that as of 2011 and 
2014: 
  The infrequency of summary judgment is not just the result of fewer motions by the 
parties.  The Eastern District is far less likely to grant a summary judgment motion than 
elsewhere.  One study found that the Eastern District’s summary judgment motion win 
rate (26.2%) paled in comparison to other popular districts, like the Northern District of 
California (45%), the Central District of California (48.2%), the Northern District of Il-
linois (38.1%), and even the District of Delaware (32%).  Another more comprehensive 
study found that accused infringers prevail . . . on summary judgment on patent invalidity 
only 18% of the time in the Eastern District of Texas, compared to 31% nationwide.  
Similarly, patent defendants prevail on non-infringement motions 45% of the time in the 
Eastern District, but 62% nationwide. 
Id. at 252–53 (footnote call numbers omitted). 
 98.  See BARRY ET AL., supra note 91, at 15; OWEN BYRD ET AL., LEX MACHINA, PATENT 
LITIGATION DAMAGES REPORT 24 (2014) (reporting that, from January 1, 2000 through December 
31, 2013, median damages in the Eastern District ranked third nationally, at $8,250,000, based on 
84 cases).   
 99.  See BARRY ET AL., supra note 91, at 16 & fig.17 (comparing outcomes in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas with the other twenty districts with five or more decisions involving NPEs).  Note that 
Delaware had a 35% win rate, and the Northern District of California had a 16% win rate.  Id.  It 
should be noted that the sample size is very small, fifty-five final NPE decisions in the Eastern 
District of Texas over a period of twenty years, for example—owing to NPEs’ high rate of settle-
ment.  Id. 
 100.  Jonathan H. Ashtor et al., Patents at Issue: The Data Behind the Patent Troll Debate, 21 
GEO. MASON. L. REV. 957, 957–59 (2014); see also BARRY ET AL., supra note 91, at 16 fig.17. 
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Lemley, and Schwartz report that for patent cases filed in 2008 through 2009, 
plaintiffs won in 45% of suits overall and 72% of cases that went to trial in 
the Eastern District, compared with 26% and 61% success rates, respectively, 
nationally.101  Their study’s multivariate regression analysis concludes that 
the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware “were both signif-
icantly more likely to rule for the patentee in the cases [they] studied than 
were the ‘non-busy’ patent districts.”102  The Eastern District’s benefits have 
not been limited to NPE plaintiffs.  PwC also reported that the win rate for 
patent plaintiffs generally in the Eastern District for 1995 to 2014 was even 
higher than the NPE win rate and highest in the nation among the leading 
fifteen patent venues, at 55%,103 with almost twice as many decisions relating 
to non-NPEs as to NPEs. 
In theory, of course, a higher win rate could reflect the selection effect 
of higher-quality patents being asserted in a particular venue.  Selection is 
always a concern when comparing districts, but it is unlikely to explain all of 
the differences here.  Studies of NPE litigation generally (including before 
the rise of the Eastern District of Texas) indicate that NPEs lose more often 
than non-NPEs in any district.104  It seems unlikely, then, that NPEs suddenly 
improved their patent quality and filed only in the Eastern District of Texas.  
This is especially difficult to believe given the sheer numbers and proportion 
of all cases there—that somehow almost all of the patents, and a significantly 
large portion of the good patents, have gravitated there despite the fact that 
very few operating companies file suit there. 
In sum, there does not seem to be one single reason that the Eastern 
District has been popular with plaintiffs.105  Rather, it seems, as Love and 
Yoon posit, the cumulative effect of many marginal advantages has made the 
district more favorable for plaintiffs than the alternatives.106  The questions 
that matter now are: Are those advantages enduring?  Or might the Eastern 
District, like other previously popular patent districts, cede its lead to other 
                                                          
 101.  See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities 
of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1770, 1793 tbl.3A, 1794 tbl.3B (2014). 
 102.  Id. at 1791–92.  
 103.  See BARRY ET AL., supra note 91 at 15 (reporting an “[o]verall success rate” of 55% from 
1995–2014); see also Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of 
Case Resolution Relative to Chain Construction: An Empirical Study of the Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. 
& TECH L. 451, 483 tbl.6 (2013) (reporting a 38% win rate in the Eastern District and a 43% win 
rate in the District of Delaware).  
 104.  See Allison et al., supra note 76, at 40 (examining litigation from 2009); Michael Risch, 
The Layered Patent System, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1548 (2016) (examining litigation from the 
1990s through 2009). 
 105.  See generally Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas 
Draws Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 299–300 
(2011) (finding a variety of reasons for the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas). 
 106.  Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation 
in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2017). 
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districts over time?  In the following paragraphs, we discuss what the dis-
trict’s procedures and practices to date suggest about whether its outsized 
influence is likely to continue in the future. 
E.  The Popularity of the Eastern District of Texas in the Future 
Assuming the favorable procedures and outcomes caused the concen-
tration of cases, are they likely to do so in the future?  While the majority of 
this paper considers this question in view of proposed venue reforms, in the 
next few paragraphs we consider how filing trends might evolve in the ab-
sence of any venue reform.  Even as venue law has largely stood still in the 
last few years, the rest of patent law has not.  The Supreme Court’s Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International107 decision has narrowed the scope of pa-
tentable subject matter, rendering a large number of existing patents inva-
lid.108  Procedures for challenging patents introduced by the 2011 AIA, in 
particular, inter partes review, have become more popular.109  A pair of Su-
preme Court cases has made it easier for prevailing parties to recoup their 
fees.110  These and related developments have generally favored defendants 
regardless of district (though not all recent developments have),111 resulting 
in high profile defense victories even in the Eastern District.  For example, 
in 2015, Judge Gilstrap simultaneously terminated 168 cases on summary 
judgment and then awarded attorneys’ fees against the plaintiff.112  In fact, 
                                                          
 107.  134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 108.  Id. at 2352 (finding abstract ideas implemented on a computer ineligible for patent protec-
tion). 
 109.  These procedures allow parties to challenge the validity of patents in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (“PTO”) without litigation.  See Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Re-
view and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews 3 n.2 (May 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Stanford Technology Law Review), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2601562 (noting the rise in inter partes petitions from 514 in 2013 to 1310 in 2014).  In 
2015, the number was 1737.  Cyrus Morton et al., Takeaways from PTAB’s Fiscal Year Statistics, 
LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:28 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/740962/takeaways-from-ptab-
s-fiscal-year-statistics. 
 110.  See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014) (find-
ing that fee decisions should be subject to abuse of discretion, rather than de novo, review); Octane 
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56 (2014) (relaxing the stand-
ard for finding a case to be “exceptional” according to the fee-shifting statute). 
 111.  Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016) (easing the standard 
to prove willful infringement). 
 112.  Joe Mullin, East Texas Judge Throws out 168 Patent Cases in One Fell Swoop, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/east-texas-judge-
throws-out-168-patent-cases-in-one-fell-swoop/; Joe Mullin, In a First, East Texas Judge Hits Pa-
tent Troll with Attorneys’ Fees, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 20, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://arstech-
nica.com/tech-policy/2015/12/in-a-first-east-texas-judge-hits-patent-troll-with-attorneys-fees/. 
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plaintiffs only won 14% of the summary judgment motions that resulted in a 
dispositive order between 2000 and June 2015.113  
Thus, while 2015 saw a record number of total cases and share of cases 
filed in the Eastern District, 2016 witnessed a decline in both figures from 
these peaks.  Total cases were down 22% from 2015 levels, and the share of 
Eastern District cases was down to 37% of the total, from 43% of the total in 
2015.114 
It is too early to tell based on the numbers whether or not the share and 
number of cases in the Eastern District was on a long-term downward trend 
before any venue reform.  However, two other data points can provide clues: 
1) how policy efforts that were intended or anticipated to reduce case con-
centration in the district, in the areas of transfer and joinder, have fared, and 
2) the impact on the district of the change to the patent system described 
earlier. 
If the “American way” is to provide plaintiffs with their choice of venue, 
an important safeguard within the U.S. system against abusive forum shop-
ping is the ability to transfer a case after it has been filed.115  The transfer 
provision states: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest 
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought.”116  For a number of years, how-
ever, the Eastern District had a reputation for being unusually hostile toward 
motions to transfer.117  But in a series of cases starting in 2008, the Fifth Cir-
cuit and Federal Circuit granted writs of mandamus to overturn transfer de-
nials out of the Eastern District of Texas.  The extraordinary orders explicitly 
laid out that when the transferee venue was “clearly more convenient,” the 
case should be transferred there.118  In the few years following the decisions, 
commentators predicted the end of “forum shopping in general—and the 
Eastern District of Texas phenomenon in particular.”119  But that’s not what 
happened. 
                                                          
 113.  Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 312–13 app.2 (showing seven summary judgment 
wins in fifty summary judgment rulings).  Of course, a primary concern is that fewer motions seem 
to reach disposition. 
 114.  Lex Machina’s Fourth Annual Patent Litigation Year in Review Report Shows 22 Percent 
Decline in Patent Filings in 2016, LEX MACHINA (MAR. 2, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/me-
dia/press/report-shows-22-percent-decline-in-patent-filings-in-2016/. 
 115.  Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1509. 
 116.  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 117.  See Anderson, supra note 22, at 676; Offen-Brown, supra note 93, at 62–63. 
 118.  Offen-Brown, supra note 93, at 62; see also id. at 75–85 (describing In re TS Tech USA 
Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008), In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. (Volkswagen I), 545 F.3d 
304 (5th Cir. 2008), and In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 119.  Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation 
and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 32 (2010). 
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Though one might have expected that the overall transfer rate would 
increase since the In re TS Tech USA Corp.120 decision, the transfer rate ac-
tually has declined.121  This may be in part because litigants have adjusted 
their behavior and have only filed in the Eastern District when cases meet the 
newly articulated standard.  For example, most of the PAEs in our data set 
were incorporated in and/or nominally headquartered in Texas, changing the 
convenience balance.  Further, electronic discovery has significantly eased 
documentary evidence concerns.  But a change in behavior and evidence can-
not explain the whole story.  The Federal Circuit has, since In re TS Tech, 
granted petitions for mandamus thirteen times, compelling the Eastern Dis-
trict to transfer patent litigation elsewhere.122  By comparison, since its found-
ing, the Federal Circuit appears to have denied all but one such petition seek-
ing transfer out of any other district court.123  Since late 2008, the district’s 
share of cases has increased markedly.  Plaintiffs appear willing to manage 
risk, hoping that their cases will not be transferred and that such a decision 
will withstand appeal. 
Another policy intervention that was intended to target the Eastern Dis-
trict addressed the number of defendants sued there.  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 20(a)(2)(A) states that defendants can be sued jointly when a claim 
arises “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences.”124  From the mid-1990s, the Eastern District (among other dis-
tricts) interpreted this rule liberally, allowing makers of different products to 
be sued jointly absent evidence that the defendants’ products were “dramati-
cally different.”125  As a result, and given NPE propensity to sue multiple 
defendants at a time,126 one study found the estimated number of defendants 
in actions filed in the Eastern District of Texas went “from 1.66, in 1994, to 
                                                          
 120.  551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 121.  See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 262. 
 122.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 & 
n.8 (2012) (identifying ten successful motions for mandamus between 2008 and 2011).  Since then, 
by our count, there have been at least five more.  In re Google Inc., 588 F. App’x 988, 992 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); In re Apple, Inc., 581 F. App’x 886, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Nintendo of Am., Inc., 
756 F.3d 1363, 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 747 F.3d 1338, 1339, 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TOA Techs., Inc., 543 F. App’x 1006, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 123.  See Gugliuzza, supra note 122, at 346 & n.10, 347 n.16. 
 124.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A).  Rule 20(a)(2) provides:  
Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted 
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any ques-
tion of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). 
 125.  Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 258.  The leading case, authored by Judge Leonard 
Davis, was MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456–57 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 126.  Risch, supra note 80, at 82 & tbl.1, 92 fig.2 (showing growth in NPE and non-NPE de-
fendant counts in districts throughout the country between 1986 and 2009). 
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12.37, in 2010,” while the national average over that period generally hov-
ered between 2 and 4, with the exception of the last year when it went to 
4.31.127  Moreover, while the Eastern District represented 10% of 2010 patent 
cases, it accounted for 25% of all patent defendants.128 
One impact of liberal joinder is to reduce the patentee’s costs by ena-
bling patentees to capture economies of scale.  However, it can also put the 
squeeze on defendants; as one of the staffers behind the AIA (and later in-
terim director of the Patent and Trademark Office) put it: 
[C]ourts typically do not increase the time for presenting evidence 
during a trial by a multiple of the number of defendants who are 
sued . . . .  Each defendant was given a sharply abbreviated amount 
of time to present its case, despite the fact that most, if not all, of 
the defendants made different products whose alleged infringe-
ment of the patent presented different factual questions.129 
When Congress had the opportunity to amend patent law in 2011, it en-
acted a stricter joinder rule for patent cases130 with “the Eastern District of 
Texas’s interpretation of Rule 20 . . . [and the] substantial denial of due pro-
cess to defendants”—or at least the perception of it—in mind.131  But while 
the average number of defendants per patent infringement suit filed in the 
Eastern District fell to 1.99 in 2014,132 this reflected plaintiffs adjusting, ra-
ther than fundamentally changing, their behavior in an entirely predictable 
way: they now sued few defendants in many separate cases instead of many 
defendants in few cases.133  Patent lawsuits continued to grow, and the total 
                                                          
 127.  See Sag, supra note 65, at 1082 tbl.3, 1084.  Another study reported that the average num-
ber of defendants in a patent infringement action filed in the Eastern District in 2010 was 13, com-
pared to between 2 and 4 in other leading districts.  See James Pistorino, Concentration of Patent 
Cases in Eastern District of Texas Increases in 2010, 81 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 803, 
805–06 (2011). Yet another reported a mean of 9.1 and a median of 4 defendants in patent actions 
filed in the district from January 1, 2008 to September 15, 2011 (the date on which the AIA was 
enacted), compared with 2.4 and 1 in the Northern District of California.  See David O. Taylor, 
Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 724, 726 tbl. (2013).  The mean number of defendants 
with an identified tie (defined as incorporation, headquarters, principal place of business, or resi-
dency) to the Eastern District was 1.2; the median was 0.  See id. at 724 n.309, 726 tbl. 
 128.  See Pistorino, supra note 127, at 805–06. 
 129.  Matal, supra note 81, at 592. 
 130.  See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012) (“[P]arties that are accused infringers may be joined in one 
action as defendants . . . only if—(1) any right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, sever-
ally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences . . . .”).  
 131.  Matal, supra note 81, at 592. 
 132.  See Sag, supra note 65, at 1084. 
 133.  The costs and benefits of the changes are difficult to disambiguate.  Allowing each defend-
ant sufficient time to present its case is a clear benefit.  There were additional defense cost benefits 
associated with not having to coordinate, but this is difficult to measure, as multiple cases are still 
often related for claim construction purposes.  But these defense cost gains may have been offset 
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number of patent defendants sued in the Eastern District grew disproportion-
ately with it, with the 2015 number of total defendants exceeding the 2010 
total.134 
These two examples show why plaintiffs have continued to file in the 
Eastern District despite developments that have restricted which cases and 
which defendants can be named in suits there.  Why has the venue’s popular-
ity persisted?  There are at least a few plausible explanations.  First, plaintiffs 
have adapted their behavior as the new rules have required—as in the case of 
joinder, by bringing more cases to compensate for the fewer number of per-
missible defendants per case.  Whether plaintiffs can do that in response to a 
particular intervention depends on the specifics of the particular case, how-
ever.  The second explanation is that, even though developments like In re 
TS Tech make certain cases harder to justify keeping in the Eastern District, 
they do not fundamentally change the calculus when plaintiffs are deciding 
to bring their cases in light of the many advantages that the forum has.  The 
third explanation might be that even as rules have changed, they have still 
provided discretion to district courts for supporting the implementation of 
rules in a way that maintains the venue’s comparative advantages over other 
jurisdictions.135 
These explanations may provide clues as to how the Eastern District 
would fare—assuming venue rules were undisturbed—in light of the more 
challenging climate that patent plaintiffs are now experiencing.  As described 
earlier, the Supreme Court has made it easier to award attorney’s fees to pre-
vailing parties and to invalidate patents as claiming impermissible subject 
matter.  Defendants can request reviews of patents that are asserted against 
them using new post-grant procedures and seek stays of parallel district court 
litigation.  The Eastern District has changed its behavior accordingly.  But 
consistent with its reputation, the data suggest that the Eastern District im-
plemented these pro-defendant changes in a seemingly pro-plaintiff way rel-
ative to other districts, at least initially. As one report stated: 
[O]n awards of attorneys’ fees post-[Octane Fitness], in 2015, the 
Eastern District of Texas granted only 9 percent of such motions, 
                                                          
(or at least redistributed) by the cost to small defendants who could previously rely on larger de-
fendants to keep a large consolidated defense going but now each had to seek counsel to take the 
lead.  
 134.  Many of those cases are on the same patents, and now courts will often construe the same 
patent multiple times.  Risch, supra note 80, at 91 (presenting data on multiple patent filings and 
outcomes).  For the total 2010 figure of 3501, see Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 249 (noting 
283 total cases in 2010); and Sag, supra note 65, at 1082 tbl.3.  See also Sag, supra note 65, at 1084 
(noting the average number of defendants sued in the Eastern District of Texas in 2010 as 12.37).  
 135.  We do not speculate in this article about why the Eastern District may seek to maintain its 
pro-plaintiff edge, but note that other commentators have identified judicial interest in patent cases, 
the positive impact of case concentration on the local economy, and post-bench career opportunities 
as possible motives.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 22, at 661–66; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 
22, at 270–77. 
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as compared to 33 percent nationwide.  And, on § 101 challenges, 
in 2015, the court granted (or partially granted) only 33 percent of 
all motions to find asserted patents ineligible, as compared to 64 
percent nationwide.136 
In the three years following the availability of the AIA’s post-grant re-
view processes, the district granted requests to stay the district court litigation 
48% of the time as compared to 58% of the time nationwide.137  Though it is 
possible that the Eastern District’s relatively lower summary judgment, stay 
and fee-shifting rates are an artifact of the cases that are filed there, plaintiff-
friendly local rules and applications of the law have been blamed as well.138  
As with other comparisons, we do not suggest that one district is more accu-
rate than another—rather, we suggest that there is a disparity.  It may be that 
“extraordinary” circumstances for fee-shifting purposes should occur 9% of 
the time.  It may also be that there are selection effects. 
These differences may diminish to some degree in the future.  For ex-
ample, though the Eastern District denied all fee-shifting requests in 2015, in 
the first four months of 2016, it granted 3 out of 10 of them, in line with 
national norms.139  Likewise, Judge Gilstrap of the Eastern District, who him-
self has decided an outsized number of cases, has suggested that he is evolv-
ing his practice.140  But regardless, as long as the district’s implementations 
                                                          
 136.  Lionel M. Lavenue et al., De Facto Patent Reform in the Eastern District of Texas, 
LAW360 (Jan. 29, 2016, 10:43 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/750017/de-facto-patent-re-
form-in-the-eastern-district-of-texas (footnote call number omitted); see also Love & Yoon, supra 
note 106, at 1 (noting that Eastern District judges tend to “exercise[] their discretion in ways that 
dampen the [impact of] reforms that were aimed (at least in part) at deterring abusive patent suits”); 
Nirav Desai & Lauren Johnson, Octane Fitness, Two Years On: How It Has Impacted District 
Courts’ Award of Attorneys’ Fees in Patent Cases, 31 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 29, 2016, at 
4, http://www.skgf.com/uploads/1455/doc/Octane_Fitness_two_years_on_how_it_has_im-
pacted_district_courts_award_of_attorneys_fees_in_patent_cases_(Desai_and_Johnson)_Wash-
ington_Legal_Foundation_April_2016.pdf (reporting that in the first year following the Octane Fit-
ness decision, the Eastern District granted none of the 13 motions for attorney’s fees motions made, 
but in the first 4 months of 2016, they granted 3 of 10). 
 137.  Jonathan Stroud et al., Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of 
Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 238–39 (2015). 
 138.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Newegg Inc. v. MacroSolve, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2475 
(2016) (Mem.) (No. 15-1369) (arguing that the Eastern District has set forth an elevated standard 
for awarding fees).  For example, Judge Gilstrap of the Eastern District initially set forth, though 
quickly withdrew, a process that made it difficult for litigants to file § 101 challenges.  See Lavenue 
et al., supra note 136. 
 139.  See Desai & Johnson, supra note 136, at 4.  
 140.  Ryan Davis, Gilstrap Eases Filing Of Patent Summary Judgment Motions, LAW360 (July 
22, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/820536 (describing the changes in Judge 
Gilstrap’s practice, including removing a requirement that litigants get his permission before seek-
ing summary judgment or filing motions seeking to invalidate a patent under Alice, and eliminating 
required in-person meetings for litigants prior to discovery); see also Lavenue et al., supra note 136 
(describing the softening of pro-plaintiff positions initially taken on fee-shifting, stays, and dispos-
itive motions by Judge Gilstrap). 
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of these developments do not fundamentally change the calculus when plain-
tiffs are deciding to bring their cases—which would only happen if, on net, 
Texas became less attractive to plaintiffs than plaintiffs’ other options—it is 
likely that plaintiffs will continue to select the district over those other op-
tions. 
F.  Proposed Changes 
Against this backdrop, there were at least two policy vehicles to change 
the venue rules, one in the courts and one in Congress.  In the TC Heartland 
case, the well-known food company Kraft Foods (“Kraft”) sued plaintiff TC 
Heartland LLC (“Heartland”) for infringement of three of Kraft’s patents 
covering liquid water enhancers.141  Though Kraft has its principal place of 
business in Illinois, it exercised its choice of venue and sued Heartland in 
Delaware, about 700 miles away from Heartland’s home venue, the Southern 
District of Indiana.142  Heartland moved to dismiss the action or transfer 
venue under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.143 
According to Heartland, it has no offices, supply contracts, registered 
business locations, or permanent presence in Delaware.  Its only connection 
to the venue, then, was that it had shipped orders of the accused product pur-
suant to two national contracts it had, amounting to about 2% of Heartland’s 
sales in 2013.144 
After the Delaware District Court denied Heartland’s motion, Heartland 
filed a mandamus petition asking the Federal Circuit to overrule the District’s 
motion.  Heartland argued that Congress’s changes to the general venue stat-
ute145 effectively superseded VE Holding and thereby restored the traditional 
interpretation of patent venue set forth in the literal language of 28 U.S.C. 
§  1400(b), wherein “reside[]” is limited to the place of incorporation or pri-
mary place of business of a firm.146  The Federal Circuit denied this motion 
and the merits of Heartland’s argument.147 
Heartland’s argument was no slam dunk before the Federal Circuit.  
First, VE Holding was delivered between the two congressional changes in 
1988 and 2011.  This means that Congress knew that patent venue was a live 
issue and yet never mentioned it (or otherwise addressed it while making the 
change in 2011).  In 1957, when Fourco was decided, one could argue that 
there had been no substantial change to venue rules that might override the 
                                                          
 141.  In re TC Heartland L.L.C., 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. TC Heart-
land L.L.C v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 142.  TC Heartland L.L.C. v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017). 
 143.  In re TC Heartland L.L.C., 821 F.3d at 1340. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), 1391(c). 
 146.  In re TC Heartland L.L.C., 821 F.3d at 1341–42. 
 147.  Id. at 1345. 
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specific meaning of patent venue.  But that is a taller order after two amend-
ments that seem to broaden the general provision to more specifically cover 
Section 1400(b)—and an appellate court ruling that agreed and governed 
venue for the next twenty-five years.  Thus, the Federal Circuit saw no reason 
to change its interpretation that the general venue statute governed. 
But, in its TC Heartland decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding 
that the specialized patent venue of Section 1400 was not changed by Con-
gress—not in 1988 and not in 2011.  Instead, the Court determined that its 
Fourco precedent had never stopped applying to venue: absent an explicit 
repeal of specialized venue, Congress did not intend the general venue statute 
to apply.  Thus, it ruled venue had been detoured for some thirty years, and 
corporations could only be sued where they are incorporated or have a regular 
place of business (and infringe). 
Where the general venue rule allows for suit nearly anywhere, the spe-
cialized statute allows for suit nearly nowhere.  Thus, another approach being 
pursued by certain members of Congress would be to amend the federal 
venue statute to allow some middle ground.  “Venue reform” has been a fea-
ture of congressional acts dating back to at least 2008.148  One latest version 
of reform, the Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (“VENUE”) 
Act of 2016,149 was introduced by Senators Jeff Flake, Mike Lee, and Cory 
Gardner in March 2016 and would have amended Section 1400 and specified 
appropriate venue in the following districts: 
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is 
incorporated; (2) where the defendant has committed an act of in-
fringement of a patent in suit and has a regular and established 
physical facility that gives rise to the act of infringement; (3) where 
the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued in the instant ac-
tion; (4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted 
research or development that led to the application for the patent in 
suit; (5) where a party has a regular and established physical facil-
ity that such party controls and operates, not primarily for the pur-
pose of creating venue, and has—(A) engaged in management of 
significant research and development of an invention claimed in a 
patent in suit prior to the effective filing date of the patent; (B) 
manufactured a tangible product that is alleged to embody an in-
vention claimed in a patent in suit; or  (C) implemented a manu-
facturing process for a tangible good in which the process is al-
leged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; or (6) in 
                                                          
 148.  See Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 8 (2008) (providing venue rules 
very similar to the Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016). 
 149.  S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).  
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the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet the requirements 
of paragraph (1) or (2), in accordance with section 1391(c)(3).150 
A version of venue reform endorsed by the Intellectual Property 
Owner’s Association would be substantially similar in terms of its impact.151  
Another version of congressional reform would leave the venue rules alone, 
but aims to increase the likelihood of transfers by mandating that full discov-
ery be stayed until a district court ruled on a transfer motion.152 
While the specifics differ, each development would aim to reduce the 
outsized influence of districts like East Texas, where few accused infringers 
are incorporated or are believed to have a regular and established place of 
business.  But if plaintiffs could not choose the Eastern District, it is unclear 
where they would choose, if they had such a choice.  While the discussion 
here has compared the Eastern District to national averages, districts are far 
from homogenous in their treatment of patents.  Thus, while NPEs exceed 
the national average win rate in Texas, in the Northern District of California 
they win 16% of the time, 10 percentage points below the national average 
for NPEs of 26%.153  Even the Northern District overall plaintiff win rate of 
26% is below the national average (33%).  As with the Eastern District of 
Texas, it could simply be that plaintiffs save all of the bad patents for the 
Northern District of California; this, too, seems unlikely.  It is not surprising, 
then, that tech companies favor this district, in addition to their own home 
districts.  And if this were a study of declaratory relief actions, the analysis 
here would likely have been that potential defendants in a position to choose 
between venues would sue in the Northern District if, factoring in home-court 
advantage, they are most likely to win there.154  Venue is in some sense a 
zero-sum game. 
One problem with retaining the state of incorporation as a possible 
venue, however, is that many large firms are incorporated in Delaware with-
out maintaining offices there.  The District of Delaware is already the second 
most popular district and sometimes subject to criticism for being overly 
friendly to patent plaintiffs (albeit somewhat less so than the Eastern District 
                                                          
 150.  Id. 
 151. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, 2015 BOARD RESOLUTIONS, http://www.ipo.org/in-
dex.php/advocacy/board-resolutions/2015-board-resolutions/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
 152.  See Congressional Research Service, Summary: S.1137—114th Congress (2015–2016), 
CONGRESS.GOV (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1137 
(“(Sec. 5) Directs courts to stay discovery in patent actions during the pendency of certain prelimi-
nary motions (motions to dismiss, transfer venue, or sever accused infringers), but allows a court to 
permit further discovery to resolve a motion or preserve evidence.  Permits parties to voluntarily 
exclude themselves from such discovery limits.”). 
 153.  See BARRY ET AL., supra note 91, at 9 fig.9, 15 fig.16, 16 fig.17. 
 154. Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum 
Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1082 (2012). 
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of Texas).155  Thus, venue reform commentators have looked for other op-
tions.  Fromer has suggested limiting venue to a domestic firm’s principal 
place of business, which she believes would “promote better decisionmak-
ing . . . by tending to aggregate technology- and industry-specific patent 
cases in those districts that already have clusters of businesses engaging in a 
technology or industry.”156  However, as Klerman and Reilly note, this might 
give rise to a corresponding risk that defendants would be unduly benefitted 
by home court advantages.157  Perhaps a better solution, as suggested by Kler-
man and Reilly, would be to limit venue to the district forming the largest 
market for the defendant’s allegedly infringing product,158 though it might be 
considerably more difficult for the plaintiff to ascertain this precise location 
in advance. 
As defendant states of incorporation would remain available to plaintiffs 
under various proposals, would cases merely move from Texas to Delaware 
if these proposals are enacted?  The hope behind these reforms—that the con-
centration of cases in the Eastern District would subside—and the fears that 
cases would just reconcentrate in Delaware can be approximated empirically.  
The next section sets out our approach for doing so. 
II.  METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS: THE CONTEXT, THE STATIC 
EFFECTS, AND THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS 
To understand the potential impact of various proposals, we tested them 
empirically.  After TC Heartland, patent venue reverts to either (1) defend-
ant’s residency (place of incorporation) or (2) a combination of infringing 
acts plus a regular-place-of-business.  The congressional VENUE proposal, 
as described above,159 would add to this set of eligible venues (3) where the 
defendant has consented to be sued, (4) where the inventor on the patent has 
done research, and (5) districts in which either party had a Research and De-
                                                          
 155.  Fromer, supra note 18, at 1492 (arguing that retaining state of incorporation as an alterna-
tive venue would “sacrifice[] the benefit of clustering suits by industry” since most firms incorpo-
rated in Delaware do not carry on their principal business there); Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, 
at 281–82, 304 (noting that Delaware is already an overly popular forum). 
 156.  Fromer, supra note 18, at 1478–79.  In a case in which all properly joined defendants are 
foreign firms with no principal place of business in the United States, Fromer would allow the 
plaintiff to sue in any district, as is the case now, and she would institute a “safety valve” under 
which a court could order a case transferred to the plaintiff’s principal place of business “in extreme 
cases that raise due process concerns.”  See id. at 1478 & n.208, 1489. 
 157.  See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 304.  Klerman and Reilly also raise the possibility 
that firms could strategically locate their principal place of business to districts “with a pro-defend-
ant reputation.”  See id.  Fromer dismisses this possibility as unlikely.  See Fromer, supra note 18, 
at 1491. 
 158.  See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 22, at 304. 
 159.  See supra text accompanying notes 148–149. 
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velopment (“R&D”) or manufacturing nexus to products embodying the in-
vention.  In this Part, we describe our methodology for modeling these rule 
changes and their impacts. 
A.  Methodology 
We performed analyses that attempted to model the main features of 
these venue rules.  We considered what would have happened in 2015 had 
either TC Heartland or VENUE Act been in effect then.  In that year, patent 
plaintiffs filed 44% of their cases in the Eastern District of Texas.  Where 
would they have filed (assuming that they would have filed at all) had the 
proposed rules of patent venue been in place?  That is, where would patent 
plaintiffs file if they couldn’t all go to Texas? 
To carry out our analysis, we asked Lex Machina to select 1000 cases 
at random160 and provide us with all of the defendants in those cases.  After 
correcting for miscodes, declaratory relief, and Doe defendants,161 we ended 
with 939 cases against 1128 defendants.  We then modeled three pieces of 
information for each defendant/case pair.  First, we approximated where each 
named defendant could be sued under proposed venue rules.  Second, we 
compared the results of the first step with the actual suit’s venue to determine 
the percentage of cases that would have to be moved to a different district 
under the proposal.  That is, we flagged a case if the plaintiff could not file 
suit in its chosen district under the proposed rule.  Third, we considered where 
plaintiff (and plaintiffs of its type) had sued in the past and matched that his-
torical behavior to locations where defendant could be sued.  Then we ap-
proximated the likely venue of each suit.  That is, if a plaintiff sued all over 
the country, then we assumed it would continue to do so.  But if a plaintiff 
sued only in one district, we assumed it would sue again in that district if it 
could legally do so.  For each plaintiff-defendant pair (“case” for short)162 
this yielded the following “matches”: 
 An exact match: The plaintiff could have filed the case as is 
without change.  For example, if plaintiff P sued defendant D 
in Oregon, and D can be sued in Oregon under the proposal, 
then the venue would not change under the proposal. 
 A plausible match: The plaintiff could have filed in “P’s pre-
ferred venue”—any venue the plaintiff filed in in 2014–2015.  
For example, assume plaintiff P sues defendant D in Delaware.  
                                                          
 160.  The cases represented those initially filed in 2015, not those transferred from another dis-
trict and opened in 2015, which are often miscounted as new cases if not carefully examined. 
 161.  Miscodes included cases that were not actually from 2015 or not patent infringement cases, 
for example.  Doe defendants were defendants listed on the complaint but not actually identified as 
a real party. 
 162.  In reality, each pair was not a case because some cases had multiple defendants.  We ad-
dress this situation below. 
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Assume as well that P filed three cases in 2014–2015, two in 
Delaware and one in Minnesota.  If D could only be sued in 
Minnesota, we would call that a plausible match.  Even though 
P did not sue D in Minnesota, P was also not necessarily ad-
verse to Minnesota, having sued someone else there in the last 
two years. 
 No match: The plaintiff could not sue in the chosen venue, but 
it could have sued in a “class preferred venue”—any venue in 
the top five of plaintiff’s type.163  For example, if plaintiff P 
sued defendant D in the Northern District of Illinois, but D 
could not be sued in the Northern District of Illinois, then there 
would be no match.  But assume D could be sued in Delaware.  
Then we flagged the case as “class preferred.”  Delaware was 
one of the top five choices for NPEs in 2014–2015, and it was 
also one of the top five choices for product companies during 
that time.164  Thus, P would sue in Delaware, whether P was an 
NPE or an operating company. 
 No match: No venue is available under any of the above op-
tions.  In this case, the plaintiff would have to sue according to 
the proposed rule but would not have any of its plausible or 
plaintiff class preferences fulfilled.  We assumed that the suit 
would be filed where the defendant’s primary place of business 
was located. 
To be sure, our model is imperfect and subject to selection effects.  
Some cases might not be filed at all if they could not be filed in their selected 
district.  Some plaintiffs might have selected a location that we coded as less 
attractive.  And all parties might change their behavior, such as where they 
conduct their research and development, in response to new rules. 
We recognize that these things could happen but believe that our static 
model is nonetheless valuable.  First, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
selection effect would be large.  For example, most plaintiffs are not located 
in Texas and could just as easily travel somewhere else.  Furthermore, the 
win rate in Texas isn’t that high and as we noted above, there are many other 
                                                          
 163.  Based on our analysis of actual patent suits from 2015, for NPEs, the top five were the 
Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware, the Northern District of California, the Northern 
District of Illinois, and the Northern District of Texas.  For PEs, the top five were the District of 
Delaware, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Texas, the Central District of Califor-
nia, and the Southern District of New York. 
 164.  Operating companies tended to favor their home districts but not nearly as much as one 
might think.  Contrary to popular belief, for example, not all pharmaceutical cases were filed in 
New Jersey.  While the “preferred class venue” categorization is the least likely, it still has some 
explanatory power.  Because it is the last choice before no match at all (defendant’s principal place 
of business), we believe that operating plaintiffs may well choose a popular district before going to 
the defendant’s principal place of business. 
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districts that may have compelling procedures and win rates.  Second, even 
if there is some selection effect, our model points to where that effect may 
be, by showing which cases would have to move to another district.  Armed 
with that data, one can bring any number of assumptions to bear about which 
types of cases are likely to move and which are likely to go away.  But those 
assumptions are many, and so we do not apply them in our model. 
1.  Sources 
We relied on Unified Patent’s coding of each case by plaintiff type: 
NPE-Patent Assertion Entity, NPE-Small Company, NPE-Individual (and in-
dividually run companies), Operating Company, and Other Entity (including 
universities, non-profits, and government and non-governmental entities).165  
When we speak of NPEs collectively, we mean PAEs, small company NPEs, 
and individuals.  We also determined the industry of the defendant and 
whether the entity was publicly or privately held.  We obtained information 
about the industry, revenue, and employee base of the defendant where pos-
sible.166  We used this profile data to better understand the impact of proposed 
rule changes on different stakeholders. 
To carry out our analysis, we relied on case law, several data sources, 
and our own assumptions.  As these have bearings on our results and intro-
duce known limitations, we describe our efforts and sources in Appendix Ta-
ble A below. 
TC Heartland restores venue to the narrowed interpretation of Sec-
tion 1400(b), which specifies that venue is proper in “the judicial district 
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”167  In Bru-
nette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.,168 the Supreme Court, 
interpreting the special patent venue statute (Section 1400(b)) as well as the 
general venue statute (Section 1391(d)), confirmed that where a corporation 
                                                          
 165.  As noted above, these codings were provided by Unified Patents.  While we might have 
quibbled with some of their NPE categorizations, these categorizations were sufficient for our pur-
poses.  For a description of their definitions, see 2015 Patent Dispute Report, supra note 13. 
 166.  We attributed revenues and employees of operating parents to each company.  To be sure, 
each entity was distinct, but the goal was to differentiate “mom and pop” defendants (of which there 
were few) from small North American offices associated with multi-billion dollar, multi-national 
conglomerates.  We did not attribute investment-only holding company revenues to any defendant 
unless the holding company was sued.  Under this methodology, we assumed that wholly owned 
subsidiaries belonged to the parent corporation (e.g., we treated each of the five ACE insurance 
entities that were sued as part of the single parent, and we profiled the QVC entity by its corporate 
owner, Liberty Interactive).  However, we did not, for example, attribute the revenue affiliated with 
investment conglomerate Madison Dearborn Partners to its subsidiary company, Things Remem-
bered. 
 167.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 168.  406 U.S. 706 (1972). 
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“reside[s]” is where it is incorporated,169 and that for “alien[s],” or foreign 
companies, venue is proper “in any district.”170  We coded qualifying venues 
accordingly, by coding state of incorporation.  Even after TC Heartland, we 
are somewhat confident that foreign corporations could be sued in any dis-
trict.171  Some might argue that, after recent Supreme Court personal juris-
diction cases,172 “resides” should instead be the principal place of business.    
To the extent that residency under Section 1400(b) might apply beyond place 
of incorporation, or the Congressional proposals suggest that it might, we 
also coded primary place of business based on the complaints (which may 
contain errors), and in some cases, company websites.  This location would 
satisfy the second prong of Section 1400(b) in any event—where the defend-
ant has a place of business and has infringed. 
For years, plaintiffs have relied on the liberal interpretation of “reside” 
under VE Holding and, therefore, have not had to rely on the prong of the 
venue statute that allows for venue where there is “infringement and [the de-
fendant] has a regular and established place of business.”173  This has changed 
now—what is old is new again.  To determine all of the places of business 
associated with each party, we used ReferenceUSA, a widely used database 
of business locations relied upon by other scholars174 which distinguishes be-
tween retail, office and manufacturing, and other types of facilities.  We sup-
plemented ReferenceUSA with data from Hoovers and company websites. 
We had to determine whether or not every retail location should qualify 
as a “regular and established place of business.”  Under the majority view, 
“control” of a business is required to trigger venue.175  Virtually any presence 
by a business will count under the statute so long as it is not transitory.176  
                                                          
 169.  Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 707 n.2 (1972) (citing 
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957)).  
 170.  Id. at 707. 
 171.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be 
sued in any judicial district, and the joinder of such a defendant shall be disregarded in determining 
where the action may be brought with respect to other defendants.”).  Even if the special patent 
venue statute applied, a strict reading of it would mean you could not sue a foreign corporation in 
any district, which would be absurd.  
 172.  See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 173.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 174.  See, e.g., Sheila E. Fleischhacker et al., Evidence for Validity of Five Secondary Data 
Sources for Enumerating Retail Food Outlets in Seven American Indian Communities in North Car-
olina, 9 INT’L J. BEHAV. NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 137 (2012), http://ijbnpa.biomedcen-
tral.com/articles/10.1186/1479-5868-9-137 (using ReferenceUSA for convenience food store loca-
tions). 
 175.  8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[2][d] (Matthew Bender ed., 2016) 
(“To constitute a ‘regular and established place of business,’ there must be some physical location 
at which the defendant conducts business and over which the defendant exercises control.”); Mat-
thew J. Sampson, Note, Corporate Venue in Patent Infringement Cases, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 207, 
223 (1990). See, e.g., In re Cray, 871 F. 3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 176.  CHISUM, supra note 175, § 21.02[2][d] (citing several very small locations constituting a 
place of business: “Generally, any physical location at which business is conducted will suffice, no 
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However, independent dealers are insufficient to establish a place of business 
unless sufficient control is exerted.177 
Thus, to determine whether a retail location was in a state, we examined 
the results from ReferenceUSA for indicia of ownership and control.  This 
included corporate-owned stores, like those owned by Costco, Wal-Mart, and 
GameStop.  We also looked to ensure that the business presence in a state 
was not attributed to a subsidiary rather than the parent.  And when the pres-
ence was attributed to the subsidiary, we flagged that as presence for the sub-
sidiary, not the parent.178  Finally, we excluded subsidiaries whether they 
were wholly owned,179 independent franchises or dealers (which are not re-
ally subsidiaries at all), or otherwise independent. 
Once we determined that a qualifying business was present in a district, 
we assumed that infringement took place in the district;180 however, this as-
sumption may not hold in every jurisdiction for every case, just as it did not 
in Fourco. 
In some cases, multiple defendants were named.  We coded each de-
fendant group and each defendant separately, analyzing not only whether or 
not the defendant, but also the defendant group, could be sued in the original 
venue or a desired venue.  In accordance with the statute, when the defendant 
group included a foreign defendant, the foreigner’s venues were excluded 
from the analysis.181 
                                                          
matter what the amount or character of the activity.”). We recognize the existence of border cases, 
such as home offices. In re Cray, 871 F. 3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  While such cases are important, 
we do not believe there were sufficient cases to affect our estimates, especially because the type of 
home offices that do not qualify would likely not have shown up in our searches. 
 177.  Id. § 21.02[2][d][iii] (“The cases generally hold that a defendant’s distribution of products 
through an independent representative or agent in the district, even on an exclusive basis, does not 
constitute a regular and established place of business.”). 
 178.  In some cases where a holding corporation’s only subsidiary was the owner of all the stores 
and the holding company was the only party sued, we attributed the store location to the parent 
holding company on the theory that a plaintiff could easily substitute the proper party in order to 
obtain venue. 
 179.  Id. § 21.02[2][d][iv] (“A defendant corporation does not have a regular and established 
place of business in a district merely because a subsidiary has such a place.  This is true even of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary so long as the formalities of separate existence are respected.”). 
 180.  Three factors also led us to make this inference—a) the ubiquity of retailers as defendants, 
b) online sales, and c) software patents.  In other words, we assumed that retailers and other branch 
locations would be accused of either selling products at local stores or using software at various 
locations (or even to communicate between locations).  Further, we assumed that companies would 
sell products into the state even if those sales were not made by the local branches.  Id. § 21.02[2][d] 
(“Furthermore, there need be no particular connection between the activity at the place of business 
and the alleged act of infringement.”).  
 181.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012). 
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2.  Approach 
While both court and congressional proposals would allow venue in the 
place of incorporation, primary place of business, or other place of business 
(with infringement), the congressional VENUE bill adds additional locations: 
1) where the defendant has consented to be sued, 2) where the inventor on 
the patent has done research, and 3) districts in which either party had an 
R&D or manufacturing nexus to products embodying the invention.182  We 
assumed defendants would not consent to any venue.  We obtained patent 
data for each lawsuit and, based on the inventor’s location listed on the face 
of each patent, determined where the inventor on the patent lived and as-
sumed that the research occurred where the inventor lived.  We attempted to 
model the portion of the proposal that allows for venue where either party 
had an R&D or manufacturing nexus to products embodying the invention as 
follows: for practicing plaintiffs and small company NPEs, we assumed that 
R&D, manufacturing, or product management took place at the location of 
the initial assignee and at the principal place of business.  For PAE plaintiffs, 
we assumed that such plaintiffs could not find an R&D location due to the 
express terms of the VENUE Act, which only offers such options to parties 
with operations.  Due to a lack of reliable information, we made no assump-
tions about research and manufacturing locations of defendants’ relevant 
products, but our inclusion of principal places of business likely compensates 
for this deficiency in some cases.  For this reason, our analysis probably over-
states the extent to which cases against larger defendants would have to move 
under the VENUE Act although, as we note below, this number is already 
relatively small. 
Another known shortcoming of our analysis is that, outside of “exact” 
matches, it is hard to tell with certainty where plaintiffs would choose to file.  
We assume that plaintiffs plausibly would file where they have before, due 
to greater familiarity with the court.  The most tenuous matches, however, 
are those that were considered “preferred” on the basis that other plaintiffs of 
the same type (e.g., NPE-operating company) favored those venues in 2014 
and 2015.  In reality, those plaintiffs might consider other factors.  After all, 
by definition, if the plaintiff had not filed in one of these districts already, it 
may be a leap to assume it would do so later.  Finally, our dataset is small—
only 939 cases.  Still, the distribution of districts and NPE filings is both 
random and representative of the population for the last full year available;183 
we believe that the results from this analysis are instructive. 
                                                          
 182.  Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. 
§ 2(b)(3)–(5) (2016). 
 183.  Of course, the fact that only one year is represented might be a limitation, though rapid 
changes in the numbers and locations of suits over the last ten years may imply that recent cross-
sections are more important than longitudinal data.  
 84 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:47 
While our primary analysis makes it possible to estimate the share of 
patent cases that are filed outside of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ primary dis-
tricts, we also thought it would be instructive to explore the extent to which 
patent cases differ (or do not) from non-patent cases along this metric.  To do 
so, we performed a supporting analysis of venue in non-patent cases, by an-
alyzing a limited sample of data with respect to two sets of defendants: (1) 
the three top patent defendants from 2015 (Samsung, Apple, and Actavis)184 
for whom we gathered data on all of their non-patent cases in 2015, and (2) 
99 randomly selected patent defendants for whom we gathered data on up to 
10 non-patent cases in 2015.185  For the randomly selected patent defendants, 
we noted where their primary place of business and state of incorporation 
were, based on complaints.  We compared these defendant districts to the 
districts where the defendant was actually sued. 
III.  RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR VENUE REFORM EFFORTS 
In Part III we present the results of our analysis, organized around the 
central questions behind the case for, and the results of, proposed venue re-
forms.  The case for reforming venue is motivated by the sense that plaintiffs 
                                                          
 184.  BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN 
REVIEW 2015, at 17 fig.28 (2016) http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/098-SHZ-
498/images/2015%20Patent%20Litigation%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf. 
 185.  Defendants include: 3M Company; ACE US Holdings, Inc.; Adore Me, Inc.; Advance 
Stores Company, Inc.; Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited; Alkem Laboratories Ltd.; Alliant Energy 
Corporation; Allstate Insurance Company; Alvogen Pine Brook Inc.; Amazon; American Airlines; 
AOL; Audible Magic Corporation; AVer Information Inc.; Avon Products; Barnes & Noble 
Booksellers; Barrel House Cooker, LLC; Bath & Body Works; Blue Cross and Blue Shield Asso-
ciation; BOK Financial Corporation; Boschung America, LLC; BPI LABS, LLC; Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Company; Broadcom Corporation; Verizon Wireless; Cequel Communications LLC; Cerid-
ian HCM, Inc.; Charter Communications, Inc.; City and County of San Francisco; Command Airsoft 
Technologies, Inc.; Commercial Bank of Texas, N.A.; Connected Telematics; Extreme Outdoor 
Products; D-Link Systems, Inc.; Dale Alldredge; Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.; Edwards Lifesci-
ences Corporation; EMC Corporation; Eva Airways; FCA US LLC; Fitbit, Inc.; Ford Motor Com-
pany; Foursevens LLC; Fremont Bancorporation; GTM Products, LLC; Harper and Two, Inc.; Hot-
pads Inc.; InterActiveCorp; Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc.; ITC Inc.; Jive Communications, Inc.; 
King Digital Entertainment PLC; Knight Transportation, Inc.; Kohl’s Corporation; KVH Industries, 
Inc.; Landis+Gyr Technologies, LLC; Ledequipped.com Corp.; LEDwholesalers.com, Inc.; Lock-
heed Martin Corporation; LA Times; Luhua Biomarine (Shandong) Co., Ltd.; Mercedes-Benz USA; 
Mylan Inc.; Dual Electronics Corp.; NEC Corporation; NeoMedia Technologies, Inc.; NHL Inter-
active Cyberenterprises, LLC; Nico Chee-Ping; Nvidia Corporation; OpticsPlanet, Inc.; Optimum 
Trading Co., LLC; OptionsXpress, Inc.; Philips Electronics North America Corporation; Praestone 
Services Ltd.; Pulse Secure, LLC; Puzhen, R.B. Sandrini, Inc.; Redbox Automated Retail, LLC; 
Regions Financial Corporation; Royal Design, Inc.; RTIC Coolers, LLC; Sandisk Corporation; 
Schurman Fine Papers; Schuster Products, LLC; Strassburg Medical, LLC; Straumann Holding AG; 
Telebrands Corp.; Texas Instruments Incorporated; Thunder Box Inc.; Tolmar Inc.; Tyco Integrated 
Security Puerto Rico, Inc.; U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc.; Vitek Industrial Video Products, Inc.; 
Voipo LLC; W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.’s; Wal-Mart; Wusthof-Trident of America, Inc.; and XO 
Communications, LLC.  We selected from our list of defendants, so if a defendant appeared in 
multiple cases, then it was more likely to be selected.  Very few defendants appeared in multiple 
cases. 
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are filing extensively out of defendants’ venues and choosing the Eastern 
District of Texas.  Congressional and court reforms are being advanced to 
ostensibly change case filing patterns in a way that would reduce the high 
concentration of cases in the Eastern District and more evenly distribute cases 
across the country, preferably in venues relevant to the cases.  Critics argue 
that reforms will not reduce concentration186 and will unduly benefit defend-
ants by moving cases to their home districts.  We test all of these premises, 
by first establishing the status quo (current filing patterns) and then by re-
porting how case filings would have been distributed according to our model 
under congressional and court reform.  We report each reform scenario sep-
arately, referring to the narrowed interpretation of Section 1400 after TC 
Heartland as “TC Heartland reform,” and to congressional enactment of the 
VENUE Act as “VENUE reform” or “congressional reform.” 
A.  How Extensively are Plaintiffs Filing Out of Defendants’ Venues? 
Though it is widely accepted that NPEs are filing in the Eastern District 
of Texas, the extent to which patent plaintiffs in general are taking advantage 
of permissive venue to sue outside of defendants’ venues has not before been 
established.  Based on our analysis, we found that defendants were sued in 
the district of their primary place of business only 14% of the time, leaving 
defendants out of their home venue 86% of the time (Table 3).  This behavior 
was not limited to NPEs—though they sued within the defendant’s primary 
venue only 10% of the time, operating companies sued within the defendant’s 
primary venue only 20% of the time and 80% of the time outside of defend-
ant’s preferred venue. 
If all defendants’ business locations are factored in, including retail 
stores, defendants were sued in a place of business 29% of the time and at the 
place of their incorporation about 15% of the time.  The salience of this result 
is unclear.  On the one hand, defendants can hardly complain about being 
sued where incorporated given that they voluntarily chose the laws and ben-
efits of the state when incorporating, especially given the long history of the 
patent venue statute.  On the other hand, many defendants have few ties to 
their state of incorporation other than filing paperwork. 
In contrast, plaintiffs sued in their own home districts 60% of the time.  
This count may be inflated by NPE formation of LLCs in the Eastern District, 
even if none of the LLC members live there.  For example, operating 
companies only sued in their home district 44% of the time.  But even when 
plaintiffs didn’t sue in their own home districts, they didn’t necessarily sue 
                                                          
 186.  Brief of 22 Law, Economics, and Business Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341) (arguing that 
there would be “no impact on the present concentration of roughly 60% of all patent cases in five 
jurisdictions”).  
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in the defendant’s primary place of business; they exercised their freedom to 
sue anywhere they wanted. 
 
TABLE 3: LOCATION OF 2015 FILINGS BY PLAINTIFF ENTITY TYPE 
Location OpCo π NPE π Total 
Defendant Principal Place 
of Business 
19.0% 10.0% 14% 
Defendant Places of 
Business (All) 
27.1% 27.3% 29% 
Defendant Place of 
Incorporation 
17.4% 12.4% 15.4% 
Defendant Businesses 
(All) or Incorporation 
35.3% 32.3% 33.2% 
Plaintiffs’ Principal Place 
of Business 
44.4% 66.7% 60% 
 
The results are different for individuals, who are not subject to the same 
expansive venue rules.  A total of 27 individuals were sued, or 2.4% of the 
defendants.  Of those, 19 were sued along with other defendants, while 8 
were sued as the only defendant.  Individuals were more likely to be sued in 
their home district, about 37% of the time.  Somewhat counterintuitively, 
however, whether individuals were sued along with other defendants or on 
their own made no difference in the rate at which they were sued in their 
home district. 
B.  Are Patent Case Filing Patterns Exceptional? 
Our comparative sample of non-patent cases shows the extent to which 
patent law may be an outlier.  Table 4 shows the results of our “deep dive” 
case studies of the three most sued patent defendants, as well as our “shallow 
dive” into the first ten cases of a random selection of 99 patent defendants.  
Fifty-two of these defendants had only patent cases, resulting in a sample that 
included 271 non-patent cases among approximately 47 defendants.187  We 
                                                          
 187.  Several of the companies hit all ten cases, while some had none at all.  Thus, the results 
could possibly be biased toward the smaller companies.  We divided the defendants into two groups: 
one of parties who saw eight or more cases and one who saw seven or less.  The percentage parties 
sued in their primary place of business did not change appreciably between groups (19% versus 
20%).  There was a difference for suits in the state of incorporation (4% versus 11%), which we 
attribute to larger companies incorporating in popular lawsuit locations such as Delaware, New 
York, and New Jersey. 
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compared non-patent filing patterns to patent filing patterns along three prin-
cipal dimensions: the extent to which defendants were sued outside of their 
primary place of business, the extent to which multiple defendants were 
named in cases, and the extent to which cases were concentrated in particular 
districts. 
Table 4 shows that non-patent cases were more likely than patent cases 
to be filed within defendants’ home districts.  But not by much—while 14% 
of patent cases were filed in the defendant’s primary place of business, 20% 
of non-patent cases were filed there.  While the difference between 14% and 
20% is significantly different,188 it is barely economically different—plain-
tiffs of all stripes file their cases where they want, and that is rarely where the 
defendant keeps its offices.189 
We observed greater differences between non-patent and patent case fil-
ing patterns along two other dimensions, however.  In 2015, about 44% (45% 
in our sample) of patent cases were filed in a single district, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas.  Among non-patent cases in our random sample, the top district 
attracted only 14% of all cases.  This suggests that while non-patent plaintiffs 
are suing in their preferred venues, rather than defendants’, they aren’t all 
choosing the same venue. 
The share of cases involving multiple defendants is also a lot higher 
among non-patent cases.  While Table 4 shows that 56% of non-patent cases 
involved multiple defendants, only 16% of patent cases did.  Ironically, the 
additional defendants in those non-patent cases did not reduce the out-of-
district filings to match patent cases.  When there were multiple parties, one 
would have expected at least one of them to be located in the district while 
all the rest would be dragged in from a distant location.  But instead, the 
random defendants were sued in groups more than half the time and yet, were 
still sued in their home district more often than patent plaintiffs. 
This evidence confirms that the AIA misjoinder rule, curbing the prac-
tice of naming multiple unrelated patent defendants in a single case, seems to 
have been successful in reducing the number of defendants in each case (con-
sistent with the spike in post-AIA cases described earlier) because there was 
a much smaller proportion of cases involving multiple defendants as com-
pared to non-patent cases.  But it also suggests that the single-defendant pa-
tent rule did not shift multiple-defendant patent cases into defendants’ home 
districts as the drafters had hoped. 
  
                                                          
 188.  P=.008 in a one-side t-test. 
 189.  Sukhatme, supra note 63, at 25 (finding 43% of diversity defendants—in a sample of more 
than 550,000 cases—are sued in their home location or state of incorporation).  The greater number 
of individuals sued in diversity may account for the differences as compared to our data, because 
personal jurisdiction is harder to obtain. 
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 14.1%  21.3%  38.2%  0.0%  20.3% 
Sued in D place
of incorporation
(POI) 




 16.2%  59.6%  73.0%  96.5%  55.6% 
Share of cases in
top district 
 45.3%  21.3%  35.1%  90.7%  13.6% 










But while comparing our random sample of non-patent cases with our 
patent cases suggests both similarities and differences between these two 
groups, our case studies provide some insight into the variable dynamics of 
particular types of non-patent cases.  First, Apple was sued outside of its prin-
cipal place of business 79% of the time and Samsung 62% of the time.  Ac-
tavis, a pharmaceutical company, in contrast, was never sued in its home dis-
trict despite hundreds of cases filed against it.  The Actavis cases comprised 
state mass tort claims, in which multiple parties all filed suit against multiple 
drug companies at once.  This is analogous in some ways to high volume 
patent litigation, in which many defendants are sued in the same district by a 
plaintiff.  In addition, many of the Samsung cases, which were filed in the 
defendant’s home district (the Northern District of California) were antitrust 
cases, which have special venue rules.  This implies that special venue rules 
can have the effect of increasing the number of cases brought in the defend-
ant’s home district.  We explore this prediction by looking next at how patent 
venue reform would change case filing patterns. 
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C.  How Would Patent Venue Reform Change Patent Case Filing 
Patterns? 
While the preceding results were based on a party-by-party analysis, we 
considered venue on a case-by-case basis in order to predict where cases 
would have been brought under different rules.  We find that if TC Heartland 
reform had been190 in effect, 52% of operating companies would have needed 
to pick a different district than they had originally chosen.  For NPEs, 60% 
would have needed to pick a different district.  Another 5% of the cases for 
each plaintiff type would be a plausible match—that is, they could be brought 
somewhere else the plaintiff sued in the last two years.  That this percentage 
is small is not surprising, given that most plaintiffs don’t sue in that many 
locations. 
If the VENUE Act were passed, however, the change from the status 
quo would be a lot less dramatic for operating company plaintiffs—only 18% 
would have to move their case while the rest could have been filed as is.  NPE 
plaintiffs also have more choice of where to file under the VENUE Act than 
under TC Heartland reform.  Even so, their choices are still significantly con-
strained: 54% would have had to move their cases, compared to the 60% of 
cases that would have had to move under the new TC Heartland rule.  Table 
5 below shows the different outcomes of our predictions. 
  
                                                          
 190.  We vacillate between past and future tense for variation, recognizing that our data is both 
an estimate of what would have happened as well as a forecast of what could happen assuming a 
similar group of plaintiffs files suit in the future. 
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TC Heartland VENUE Act 















5.7% 5.0% 5.2% 4.3% 6.8% 6.1% 
No Match—
But D can be 
sued in a 
popular 
district 
26.0% 36.9% 33.7% 7.5% 31.5% 24.3% 
No Match—
D cannot be 
sued in any 
of the above 
20.6% 18.1% 18.8% 6.0% 15.3% 12.6% 
 
Table 5 shows that under TC Heartland reform, 42% of the cases would 
remain in place with another 5% moving to another district that the plaintiff 
had used in the past.  That number grows to 57% exact matches under the 
VENUE Act with another 6.1% for plausible matches.  The plausible matches 
were smaller than expected but consistent with the data given that most plain-
tiffs only sued in one or two districts.  Thus, there were few places for them 
to go if they could not file in their first choice.  The “popular” district results 
are not surprising.  Because many cases are currently filed in Texas, Dela-
ware, California, and Illinois, and because many defendants are located in at 
least one of those places, then displaced plaintiffs could have properly sued 
many defendants in one of those popular districts if they chose to. 
D.  Where Would Patent Cases Move To? 
Given the predicted displacement, we attempted to predict where cases 
might move to.  Table 6 below reports the original locations of each case, 
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followed by the likely location after each proposed reform.191  The distribu-
tion of original cases roughly matches the venue location of the full popula-
tion, implying a representative data set. 
We found that under TC Heartland reform, 46% of defendants would 
be sued in the district of their principal place of business.  This drops to 37% 
under the VENUE Act.  In that sense, the VENUE Act comparatively favors 
operating plaintiffs (who can now sue at their home location as compared to 
TC Heartland) with minor effects on NPE plaintiffs (who cannot sue in their 
home location). 
Results are divided by NPE- and non-NPE-initiated cases to show the 
varying impacts of venue rule changes. 
 
TABLE 6: MODELED VENUE UNDER DIFFERENT REFORM OPTIONS, BY 
PARTY TYPE 
 













E.D. Tex. 7.8% 4.6% 5.0% 64.1% 19.0% 19.1% 
D. Del. 10.0% 18.9% 11.0% 7.3% 25.8% 23.1% 
D.N.J. 10.3% 12.1% 10.7% 0.9% 2.4% 2.0% 
C.D. Cal. 7.5% 14.2% 9.6% 2.1% 2.6% 2.4% 
N.D. Cal. 5.0% 2.8% 3.9% 3.0% 17.3% 16.6% 
S.D.N.Y. 3.9% 3.6% 3.6% 2.7% 3.0% 2.7% 
N.D. Ill. 3.6% 1.8% 3.2% 2.7% 4.1% 4.3% 
N.D. Tex. 1.4% 0.4% 0.7% 2.7% 3.6% 3.3% 
S.D. Fla. 0.4% 1.8% 1.1% 2.9% 1.8% 4.6% 
W.D. 
Wash. 
3.6% 1.4% 3.6% 0.5% 1.2% 1.5% 
 
Table 6 makes clear that either of the proposed changes to the venue 
rules would likely result in a general shift in case locations.  For NPE cases, 
that would be decidedly away from the Eastern District of Texas, though 19% 
of cases could still be brought there, down from nearly 65%.  But both NPE 
and non-NPE cases would primarily move to the District of Delaware, whose 
share would increase from 10% to 19% for operating companies and from 
7% to 25% for NPEs.192  Interestingly, a move to the Northern District of 
                                                          
 191.  Only the top ten districts are shown; there were ninety-four districts in total. 
 192.  Here, too, there are assumptions, for example, that changes in other districts will not affect 
the propensity to bring suit there.  But see, e.g., Barnes & Thornburg LLP Intellectual Prop. Dep’t, 
“The Times They Are a-Changin’”—Delaware’s Judge Stark Outlines New Patent Case Manage-
ment Practices, NAT’L. L. REV. (May 16, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/times-they-
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California is only pronounced for NPE cases, from 3% to more than 16%, 
whereas operating companies would likely sue there less than they already 
do. 
Table 6 also shows that the overall redistribution of NPE cases under 
the VENUE Act would be comparable to the impact of TC Heartland reform, 
but that operating company cases would redistribute to lesser extent under 
VENUE than under TC Heartland reform.  Under the VENUE Act, we esti-
mate that operating company filings in Delaware would rise from the present 
10% to 11%, whereas TC Heartland reform would result in 19% of non-NPE 
cases being filed there.  Similarly, filings in the Central District of California 
would rise only 2% (from 7.5% to 9.6% of all cases) under congressional 
reform rather than double (from 7.5% to 14.2%) under TC Heartland.  Note 
that these differences are not offset by large gains among the top-ten most 
popular districts.  Instead, operating companies would continue to sue where 
they sue now— at their own primary places of business, which are geograph-
ically dispersed. 
This explains why NPE filing patterns would be similar under the 
VENUE Act or court-initiated TC Heartland reform.  NPE primary places of 
business are mostly in the Eastern District of Texas.  Putting aside for a mo-
ment the question of whether they actually operate out of Texas (a hotly dis-
puted point), the VENUE Act would not allow them to file in Texas because 
they do not make a product there.  Thus, there would be no shift to the plain-
tiff’s hometown, the way there would be for operating companies.  We do 
not address whether this is by design to deliberately harm NPEs or whether 
it is merely favoritism to plaintiffs that actually perform research, develop-
ment, and manufacturing.  We do note, however, that our final predictions 
are not foregone conclusions.  We defaulted to the defendant’s place of busi-
ness if there were no other matching districts, but presumably NPEs could 
file where the original inventors lived, and that would be geographically dis-
persed.  If NPEs did file where their inventors lived, then litigation might 
wind up in many different districts that no one has considered. 
E.  How Concentrated Would Cases Be? 
Table 7 lists the net effect of the reforms on the most popular districts 
and the concentration of cases within them.  Regardless of the model, the 
distribution of cases would be decidedly less concentrated with respect to the 
most populous district.  The District of Delaware would be the most popular 
district, but it would host about half of the Eastern District of Texas’ 2015 
share under TC Heartland reform and a smaller share under the VENUE Act.  
While a ~24% share is sizeable, it does not necessarily represent more than 
                                                          
are-changin-delaware-s-judge-stark-outlines-new-patent-case-management-pr (discussing changes 
in a Delaware judge’s case management practices and whether such changes will affect filing strat-
egy). 
 2017] RECALIBRATING PATENT VENUE 93 
Delaware has seen in the past.  If we assumed that filings continued at their 
2016 pace of 4534 cases per year, which is aggressive, a ~24% share would 
be about 1088 cases, less than Delaware saw in 2013 and close to what it saw 
in 2012.193 
SHARE TABLE 7: PREDICTED MOST POPULAR DISTRICTS, BY REFORM 
OPTION 
District 2015 Actual Heartland VENUE Act
D. Del. 9% 23.8% 19.5% 
E.D. Tex. 44% 14.7% 14.9% 
N.D. Cal. 4% 13.0% 12.8% 
C.D. Cal. 5% 6.1% 4.6% 
D.N.J. 5% 5.3% 4.6% 
 
While the top district would be less concentrated, the top three districts 
would, in total, account for about 50% of all the cases—the same as they do 
in the first half of 2016 (but about 10% less than in 2015).  The cases would, 
however, be a bit more distributed among those three districts, with the Cal-
ifornia courts seeing 17%–19% of cases, up from 9% in 2015, and the Eastern 
District of Texas shrinking its docket share to about a third of its 2015 
share.194 
When divided by entity type, however, the concentration changes.  
NPEs would be concentrated in the same top three districts with about 40% 
in Delaware and Northern California and another 19% in Texas.  Among op-
erating company cases, the top three districts would be Delaware, Central 
California (Los Angeles), and New Jersey with the top two hosting 31% of 
cases under TC Heartland reform and 22% of cases under the VENUE Act.195 
IV.  PARTIES MOST LIKELY TO SEE RELIEF AND REFORM 
The model also allows some examination of which parties would be 
most impacted by venue reform.  We relied upon plaintiff coding provided 
by Unified Patents and gathered industry and size data about the defendants 
to make these determinations.  Although reliable revenue and size data are 
generally available for public companies, as with any data relating to private 
companies, the data we provide are only categorical estimates rather than 
pinpoint determinations. 
                                                          
 193.  See The Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On In-
tellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Colleen Chien, 
Associate Professor, Santa Clara University Law School), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/06/06.13.17-Chien-Testimony.pdf (noting that decrease in overall filings may 
mean that Delaware will not see as many cases even if its share of cases increases). 
 194.  See supra Table 7. 
 195.  See supra Table 6. 
 94 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:47 
Coding the defendants by industry allowed us to also take a representa-
tive snapshot of the varying degree to which industries are impacted by NPE 
and non-NPE cases in general.  Retailers, tech, and financial services com-
panies have formed a big Tent defense patent coalition to lobby for reforms 
to litigation, and a look at the distribution of existing cases confirms why.  
Within our sample, 100% of financial services patent cases and over 75% of 
communication services, software, high-tech, and retail patent cases were 
NPE-initiated.  In the pharmaceutical sector, only 23% of suits were brought 
by NPEs.  Upon closer inspection, the majority of these cases appear to have 
involved high-tech patents (asserted, e.g., by Data Carriers LLC, Eclipse IP, 
and eDekka LLC) that pharmaceutical firms were using, not devising. 
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TABLE 8.1: DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED 2015 CASES, BY DETAILED 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRY196 
Industry Count of Ds197 NPE NPE% 
Education 3 3 100% 
Financial 71 71 100% 
Communication Services 52 51 98% 
Oil & Gas 11 10 91% 
Software 107 91 85% 
High Tech 219 182 83% 
Paper/Printing 24 18 75% 
Transportation 59 44 75% 
Retail 160 118 74% 
Business Support 37 27 73% 
Farms/Food 49 34 69% 
Clothes Manufacturing 26 18 69% 
Fitness/Entertainment 6 4 67% 
Medical 41 23 56% 
Building/Tools 25 14 56% 
Consumer Goods 45 18 40% 
Sports Manufacturing 21 7 33% 
Industrial Goods 36 11 31% 
Pharma 103 24 23% 
When we grouped these industry segments into larger sectors, as shown 
in Table 8.2, we found that the industry most sued by NPEs was tech: The 
primary industry of 42% of NPE defendants was in the broader tech-sector.  
The remaining majority (58%) of NPE defendants were in non-tech sectors 
                                                          
 196.  See the Appendix for a broader industry distribution and how we grouped the finer grained 
categories depicted in this chart into those categories. 
 197.  Related defendants are each counted. 
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including retail and services, sectors that themselves use, rather than make, 
technology.  This implies that naming the users and sellers, rather than the 
makers, of technology is a common practice of NPEs.  Given the ubiquity of 
software innovation even in  traditional sectors like manufacturing,198 it is not 
possible to tell what precise share of the defendants in the manufacturing and 
financial services sectors, for example, were sued because they were custom-
ers or sellers rather than makers, of technology.199  But defendants from the 
retail, services, biopharma, and other sectors together represented 35% of all 
NPE defendants, a sizeable share, as Table 8.2 shows. 
TABLE 8.2: DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED 2015 CASES, BY BROAD 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRY200 
D Industry Share of All Ds Share of NPE Ds 
Tech 34% 42% 
Manufacturing 17% 12% 
Retail 14% 15% 
Biopharma 13% 6% 
Other 10% 11% 
Finance 6% 9% 
Services 3% 3% 
 
With this baseline established, we probed the question of which defend-
ants would benefit from venue reform, in the sense that cases would need to 
be refiled so that they reflected some nexus to the defendant’s business and 
not just plaintiff’s choice.  In particular, we considered the relationship be-
tween the defendant’s geography, size, and industry and the share of cases 
that would have to be refiled. 
                                                          
 198.  See generally Ashish Arora et al., The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in 
American Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact, 45 RES. POL’Y 1113 (2016) (reporting on the role 
of customers and other sources of innovation across a variety of fields). 
 199.  The phenomenon of patentees suing end users of technology that may, for example, use 
communications technology (like wifi or scanning) or other types of software (for example, to fa-
cilitate e-commerce transactions) to offer their services is explored further in Colleen Chien & Ed-
ward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En Masse for Patent Infringement and 
What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235 (2014). 
 200.  See the Appendix for how we grouped finer-grained categories into the ones depicted in 
this chart. 
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A.  Which Parties (by Geography) Would Benefit or Lose from Venue 
Reform? 
Overall, VENUE Act reform would require only 18% of non-NPE cases 
to be refiled and over 50% of NPE cases to be filed in another district. 
1.  Impact on Defendants (based on TC Heartland) 
The differential impact on defendant types is illustrated most clearly in 
the analysis of TC Heartland reform, which would have required a majority 
of both NPE and non-NPE cases to move.  Among defendants sued by NPEs, 
companies located all over the country would move districts at about the 
same relative rate.  However, in absolute terms, the number of defendants 
headquartered201 in Northern and Central (Los Angeles) California is much 
larger than the others.  More than a quarter of all the moved NPE cases would 
affect companies headquartered in those two districts alone.  Further, reform 
would affect nearly 75% of the NPE cases filed against companies from those 
two districts. 
Among those companies sued by operating companies, the defendants 
that would see the greatest share of their cases move are defendants head-
quartered in New Jersey (known for pharmaceuticals), the Northern District 
of Illinois, and the Northern District of California. 
Some cases would not move, however.  Foreign defendants would get 
relief only 5% of the time—primarily in cases in which they were defendants 
with non-local U.S. companies.  There were very few of these cases as most 
foreign companies were either sued on their own or were sued with compa-
nies located in the district. 
2.  Impact on Plaintiffs 
We found that not only would defendants experience venue reform dif-
ferently, but so would plaintiffs, both NPEs and operating companies. 
a.  NPE Plaintiffs 
In general, university, small company, and individual NPE plaintiffs 
would experience less dislocation than would PAEs, as illustrated in Table 9.  
In fact, the universities and non-profits would not have to change where they 
sued at all, and individuals would have to move their suits to a lesser degree 
than operating companies.  But the differences between NPEs were much 
more dramatic under the VENUE Act: While 55% of PAEs would have to 
move their suits, only 18% of individual and 21% of small company NPEs 
would have to do so.  Operating companies would have to move their suits 
                                                          
 201.  Also known as their primary place of business. 
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18% of the time.  While these differences are dramatic, they are not surpris-
ing.  Individuals and failed small companies lack the sophistication, re-
sources, and favorable economies of scale that drive PAEs to file in the East-
ern District of Texas.  Universities likely also prefer to sue in their hometown, 
and because they do research there, the VENUE Act permits them to do so.  
But PAEs cannot do so; to the extent that individuals, small companies, and 
universities are asserting their patents with the help of PAEs, limits on PAEs 
also indirectly limit their options.  This might channel lawsuits away from 
PAEs and into inventor-owned companies. 
TABLE 9: IMPACT OF VENUE REFORM BY PLAINTIFF TYPE 







5 0% 0% 
NPE (Individual) 174 18% 41% 
NPE (Patent Assertion 
Entity) 
222 55% 59% 
NPE (Small Company) 192 21% 54% 
Operating Company 241 18% 51% 
 
b. Operating Company Plaintiffs (Under TC Heartland Reform) 
Though operating company plaintiffs would only move 18% of their 
cases under the VENUE Act, 51% of their cases would have moved under 
TC Heartland.  Among the plaintiffs, those with a principal place of business 
in the Eastern District of Texas would be the most impacted.  More than two-
thirds of plaintiffs located there would have had to file their cases in another 
district.  Most of these are NPEs, though a handful of operating companies 
were also affected by the model.  Among operating companies, about one-
third of foreign plaintiffs would have had to choose a different district.  Vir-
tually all of the cases filed by operating companies located in Washington, 
Utah, and Illinois would have to file their cases elsewhere. 
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B.  Which Defendants (by Size) Would Benefit Most from Venue 
Reform? 
Companies of all sizes would be impacted by venue reform but non-
uniformly.  We generally find that smaller defendants (as defined by revenue) 
would benefit more from venue reform than larger defendants.  For example, 
Table 10 and Figure 1 show that cases against defendants making less than 
$10 million in revenue would get venue relief 43%–69% of the time (under 
VENUE and TC Heartland reform, respectively) while cases against defend-
ants making more than $100 billion would get relief only 25%–29% of the 
time.  It should be noted that, in the case of VENUE reform, companies of 
all sizes (up to $5 billion, at least) would be impacted by reform by about the 
same amount.  That is, company size makes less of a difference under the 
VENUE Act, at least up to a certain point.202 
That small companies would benefit more from venue reform makes 
sense because their smaller footprints subject them to venue in fewer districts 
under proposed reforms.  In strongest contrast, a case against large retailers 
that have a presence in many if not all districts would not need to be moved 
if the retailer had a location in the district of suit. 
FIGURE 1:  
 
First Column: Venue, Second Column: TC Heartland 
  
                                                          
 202.  Table D in the Appendix provides more information. 
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TABLE 10: 
Share of Defendants Impacted by Venue Reform 
Revenue of D Number of Ds VENUE TC Heartland 
0-10M 182 43% 69% 
10+-100M 174 45% 68% 
100M+-1B 222 48% 58% 
1B-5B 192 43% 54% 
5B+-100B 241 38% 43% 
100B+ 48 25% 29% 
 
Another clear takeaway is that TC Heartland reform will likely benefit 
smaller defendants more than VENUE Act reform would.  That is because 
small defendants sued by operating company plaintiffs were less likely to see 
a venue change under the proposed VENUE Act than the rule post TC Heart-
land.203  The correlation between number of employees and share of cases 
that would move was less linear, but it remains the case that defendants with 
the largest number of employees had the lowest chance of having their cases 
moved.204 
C.  Which Defendant Industries Would Benefit Most from Venue 
Reform? 
Different industries would see different effects of venue reform.205  Ta-
ble 11 shows the modeled changes associated with different defendant indus-
try segments.  If the future follows the past, TC Heartland will provide venue 
relief to over 50% of the defendants in all major sectors except finance and 
biopharma.  Table 11 projects that the defendant industries that would expe-
rience the greatest relief, as estimated based on the proportion of cases that 
would need to migrate away from current venues, under TC Heartland would 
be services, finance, and tech. 
  
                                                          
 203.  All differences below $5 billion were statistically significant (p < .001). 
 204.  See Appendix Table D (estimating the percent of case movement based on revenue and 
employees). 
 205.  Industry is based on SIC Codes combined with an analysis of company business to further 
narrow defendants into relevant categories. 
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TABLE 11: ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF VENUE REFORM BY BROAD 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRY 
Industry Defendants TC Heartland Venue Act 
Services 37 65% 54% 
Tech 378 62% 48% 
Manufacturing 188 60% 34% 
Other 117 52% 38% 
Retail 160 51% 39% 
Finance 71 46% 51% 
Biopharma 144 44% 33% 
 
Under the VENUE Act, the defendant industries that would experience 
the least amount of relief, based on the same methodology, are biopharma, 
manufacturing, and other industries, including transportation and education 
products.206  These industries have many branches in different locations.  As 
a result, they are more likely to be found in one of the districts that plaintiffs 
might prefer.  Also on this list are pharmaceutical and drug companies.  In 
those cases, however, the low likelihood of change is due more to the plain-
tiff’s selection of a convenient district than it is to a branch location in, say, 
the Eastern District of Texas. 
At the granular level, high-tech (which includes computer and electron-
ics companies), printing, and business support (which includes internet-based 
service providers) defendants would be more likely to receive relief from 
venue reform.207  Companies in these industries typically have one or two 
business locations but otherwise would likely need to be sued in their home 
districts.  Consumer and industrial goods manufacturers are similar because 
their products are made in one place and then shipped to other locations. 
As before, the percentages of “dislocated” cases are lower across the 
board under the VENUE Act, and the differences between industries are less 
pronounced.  That said, the percentages of affected cases remain higher in 
the software, high-tech, printing, and business support industries.  These in-
dustries see a higher proportion of NPE cases, and NPE plaintiffs do not gen-
erally get the choice of venue that other plaintiffs do. 
D.  How might TC Heartland boost the Patent Pilot Program? 
 One unexpected beneficiary of TC Heartland might be the Patent Pilot 
program, a 10-year Congressional initiative enacted as part of the America 
Invents Act that allows cases to be funneled to districts and judges that opt 
                                                          
 206.  Appendix Table E provides more granular industry breakdowns. 
 207.  See Appendix Table E. 
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into the program.208  The idea was to allow plaintiffs to choose venues where 
judges were experienced, and welcomed, rather than dreaded patent cases.209  
But because of the forum issues described above, over the past five years, 
plaintiff’s choices have arguably been driven largely by the lure of procedural 
benefits rather than substantive expertise.  A study by Amy Semet has found 
that during this time, while judges that do not like patent cases arguably have 
been able to more easily avoid them, pilot judges have not achieved greater 
success on appeal.210  With the change to venue law, the expertise and spe-
cialization offered by the Patent Pilot program may well be more of a decid-
ing factor for plaintiffs with options about where to file, enabling the promise 
of realizing the potential of trial court specialization to be more thoroughly 
tested. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the concentration of cases in the Eastern District 
of Texas and explores how changing venue rules might affect that concentra-
tion of cases.  It considered where parties have been sued, where they would 
be sued under different rules, and which types of parties will be affected.  It 
found that every type of plaintiff tends to sue in its preferred district, which 
is usually not where the defendant is located.  It also examined how proposed 
reforms might change this behavior, particularly as to the Eastern District of 
Texas.  Court reform—the TC Heartland opinion—goes the farthest; we 
found that both NPEs and non-NPEs would not have been properly venued 
in most of their cases under Section 1400(b).  We also found that the reforms 
Congress is contemplating would impact product and service plaintiffs less 
than NPEs.  The normative takeaways from this exercise will surely depend 
on viewpoint, as well as assumptions about where plaintiffs would choose to 
file or whether they would file at all under a new system.  But as venue reform 
rolls out, this Article has shown who will be affected, where they are cur-
rently filing cases, and where they could have filed in an alternate world. 
The analysis presented here is largely static, so we take a moment to 
discuss the possible dynamic impacts on litigant behavior.  First, patent as-
sertion entities may adapt their behavior, focusing on foreign defendants and 
defendants with large footprints, like retailers and their customers.  Calls for 
                                                          
 208.  See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Addressing the Elephant: The Potential Effects of the Patent 
Cases Pilot Program and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 
(2013). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Amy Semet, Patent Law Differences Among the Federal District Courts: A Review of the 
Patent Pilot Project at the Five Year Mark (unpublished manuscript), http://scholar.prince-
ton.edu/sites/default/files/amysemet/files/semet_amy_patent_paper.docx (finding, based on a care-
ful five-year review, that, “the pilot program has not yet achieved its aims and that specialized 
judges do not have greater success on appeal.”) 
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customer stay or other provisions may become more urgent.  Patentholders—
operating companies as well as patent assertion entities—may lobby for a 
more moderate rule.  If the pre-Heartland rule was plaintiff friendly, the post-
Heartland rule could be considered defendant friendly, with equity perhaps 
lying somewhere in between. Unlike TC Heartland, which impacts all plain-
tiffs uniformly, the Senate’s VENUE act, which we also modeled, takes a 
more surgical approach—impacting a majority (54%) of NPE cases, we 
found, but only a small minority (14%) of non-NPE cases.  Third, other prob-
lems could remain unresolved or get worse.  The best options the smallest 
defendants now have, while less expensive than litigating in Texas, still cost 
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars and a lot of stress, making nuisance 
settlement attractive.  The smallest plaintiffs likewise can’t afford to defend 
against challenges to their patent and will have fewer options to sell their 
patents. 
Poor patent quality as well as changes in the law are expensive to keep 
up with, placing the smallest parties at a disadvantage.  How we encourage 
innovation in the patent system through technology transfer, licensing, and 
commercialization, and not litigation should remain in view of policymakers. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A: DATA SOURCES AND COMMENTS 
Data  Primary Data Source Comments 
1,000 2015 cases selected 
at random 
Lex Machina Final cases reflect slight 
skew to NPE cases (71% in 
sample211 versus 67% over-
all212), but are representa-
tive of venue distribution 
Plaintiff status codings 
(e.g., NPE, OpCo, Individ-
ual) 
Unified Patents 
Party Place of Incorpora-
tion and Primary Place of 
Business 
Complaints Supplemented with website 
research 
Place of Business with 
R&D or manufacturing 
nexus to the invention  
ReferenceUSA, Innography Supplemented with website 
research and Hoovers 
Revenue, Employee Size, 
Industry 
ReferenceUSA, Lexis com-
pany databases, including 
Dun & Bradstreet and Hoo-
vers 
Supplemented with website 
research and third party in-
dustry classifications (e.g., 
Manta) 
 
TABLE B: DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED 2015 CASES, BY BROAD DEFENDANT 
INDUSTRY 
Defendant Industry Number of Ds NPE Defendants NPE% 
Finance 71 71 100% 
Tech 378 324 86% 
Retail 160 118 74% 
Services 37 27 73% 
Other 117 85 73% 
Manufacturing 188 96 51% 
Biopharma 144 47 33% 
Total (including N/As) 1128 777 69% 
 
  
                                                          
 211.  These figures come from the Authors’ analysis. 
 212.  2015 Patent Dispute Report, supra note 13, at fig.7. 
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TABLE C: INDUSTRY CONCORDANCE213 




Business Support Services 
Clothes Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Communication Services Tech 






Industrial Goods Manufacturing 
Medical Biopharma 









                                                          
 213.  Derived primarily from NAICS codes provided by Manta and Reference USA. See Table 
A, supra for additional sources. 
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TABLE D: ESTIMATED PERCENT OF CASE MOVEMENT BASED ON REVENUE AND 
EMPLOYEES214 
 
The “not available” category contains mostly individuals, along with the few com-
panies for which we could find no data.215 
  
                                                          
 214.  Derived primarily from Reference USA. See Table A, supra for additional sources. 












$0-$299,999 14 57% 43% 1-9 79 67% 39% 
$300,000-
$999,999 
28 68% 39% 10-24 70 64% 39% 
$1,000,000-
$4,999,999 
86 67% 42% 25-49 63 65% 43% 
$5,000,000-
$9,999,999 
51 73% 43% 50-100 60 72% 52% 
$10,000,000-
$24,999,999 
59 66% 47% 100-199 60 72% 47% 
$25,000,000-
$99,999,999 
113 68% 47% 200-499 77 65% 51% 
$100,000,000-
$299,999,999 
111 66% 50% 500-999 72 57% 44% 
$300,000,000-
$999,999,999 
114 53% 46% 1000-
1999 
71 61% 55% 
$1,000,000,000-
$4,999,999,999 
193 53% 42% 2000-
4999 
90 61% 52% 
$5,000,000,000-
$19,999,999,999 
136 41% 38% 5000-
9999 
84 51% 36% 
$20,000,000,000-
$99,999,999,999 
104 46% 38% 10000-
19999 
77 42% 36% 
$100,000,000,000+ 50 28% 24% 20000-
49999 
87 49% 44% 
Not Available 69 55% 29% 50000-
99999 
52 38% 33% 
    100000-
249999 
86 41% 36% 
    250000+ 30 20% 10% 
    Not 
Avail-
able 
70 53% 29% 
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TABLE E: ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF VENUE REFORM BY DETAILED 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRY 
 N Heartland VENUE Act 
Building/Tools 25 48% 28% 
Business Support 37 65% 54% 
Clothes Manufacturing 26 42% 27% 
Communication Services 52 38% 33% 
Consumer Goods 45 69% 36% 
Education 3 67% 67% 
Farms/Food 49 49% 35% 
Financial 71 46% 51% 
Fitness/Entertainment 6 67% 50% 
High-Tech 219 64% 48% 
Industrial Goods 36 56% 22% 
Medical 41 66% 49% 
Oil & Gas 11 64% 55% 
Paper/Printing 24 71% 63% 
Pharma 103 35% 27% 
Retail 160 51% 39% 
Software 107 71% 57% 
Sports Manufacturing 21 67% 24% 
Transportation 59 53% 39% 
 
